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“TO SAY WHAT THE LAW IS:” JOHN MARSHALL AND HIS INFLUENCE ON THE 
ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AMERICA 
 
CHAPTER ONE: Introduction 
 John Marshall should be considered the “Father of the Judiciary” in the same 
manner that George Washington is hailed as the “Father of the Nation” and James 
Madison as the “Father of the Constitution.” Few men in American history have had as 
great an influence on the Courts as he. Not only was Marshall the longest serving chief 
justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, but the decisions he handed down 
shaped the early interpretation and implementation of the Constitution. The 1803 case 
Marbury v. Madison is perhaps the most important case he decided, for it expanded the 
power of the Supreme Court, making it a more equal branch of government. In a mere 
eleven thousand words, Marshall declared what no justice before him had stated: that it 
is the role of the courts to interpret the Constitution and determine what is law. But 
unlike what scholars have argued in the past, Marshall did not simply decide the outcome 
of Marbury v. Madison to further his own political agenda; rather, his decision was 
influenced by his personal ideology shaped by the events of his life. 
 The influence of Marshall’s life on his political beliefs stretches back to his service in 
the early days of the Revolution. As an officer in the Continental army, Marshall first 
developed his belief in a strong central government, but also acquired leadership 
experience that would propel him to the forefront of the political stage. His education at 
the College of William and Mary under Chancellor George Wythe deepened his belief in 
the separation of powers for government. As a lawyer in Richmond, Marshall rose to 
prominence through his service as counsel on a number of British debt cases and land 
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title claims in the Northern Neck of Virginia. His increased notoriety, coupled with his 
developing sympathies for the protection of property and honoring of contracts, would 
form him into a leading political and legal figure. During the ratification process for the 
Constitution, Marshall would emerge as a prominent Federalist, championing an 
independent judiciary and constitutional supremacy. Finally, as a member of the House 
of Representatives and then of President John Adams’s cabinet, Marshall defended the 
Adams administration and emerged as a Federalist hero. After the bitter Election of 
1800, Marshall would assume the seat of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States. I submit the argument that examination of selected moments in John 
Marshall’s life reveal the opinion he writes in Marbury v. Madison to not just be a great 
political coup but rather a pragmatic, calculated approach to formally implement the 
power of judicial review, establish the supremacy of the Constitution, and create a more 
defined system of checks and balances in the new American government. 
 
Methods 
I have divided this treatise into two sections: the first section will examine 
selected events from Marshall’s life to understand how he developed into the Federalist 
leader he was when he first ascended to the Supreme Court bench and to gain a better 
understanding of the creation of his political ideology. The second section will examine 
Marbury v. Madison and analyze Marshall’s opinion to demonstrate how his life and 
experiences directly influence his decision. I suggest that selected elements from 
Marshall’s life directly influenced the development of his political ideology and his rise to 
prominence as a Federalist leader. I lay these elements out in a roughly chronological 
order, in an attempt to tell a story of how Marshall rises in state and national politics 
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during the early federal period. To best understand what specific events of Marshall’s life 
directly shape his decision, I introduce the reader first to those elements that I argue bear 
the most influence on his opinion. Then, after establishing Marshall’s ideology through 
the events that shaped it, I analyze the facts of the 1803 case Marbury v. Madison and the 
opinion Marshall handed down to demonstrate how Marshall decided the case not on 
political grounds, but rather from a place of pragmatism. Though Marshall’s argument 
does indicate his political motivations, it also reveals a genuine belief in the supremacy of 
the Constitution, a calculated attempt to formalize the power of judicial review for the 
Court, and a desire to restrain continued partisan bickering after the Election of 1800. 
This treatise is not meant to be an exhaustive biography of the life of John 
Marshall. Many such works already exist and provide a greater scope of depth and detail 
than I can provide in this format. Scholars before me have detailed the life of the Chief 
Justice, many in multi-volume series. The collection of The Papers of John Marshall 
provides a first-hand account of the events and conversations that transpired during his 
life; his life has additionally been documented in multiple works by scholars throughout 
the past two hundred years, from Marshall’s colleague Associate Justice William Story to 
twentieth century historian Albert Beveridge to contemporary scholar Jean Edward 
Smith. Instead, I focus on those specific events that directly impact the decision Marshall 
formulates in Marbury v. Madison. 
This work is not meant to be an encompassing legal analysis of Marshall’s 
opinion in Marbury v. Madison either. Rather, this work is intended to provide an 
alternative view to the influences on Marshall in his decision. Where prior legal scholars 
have held that Marshall staged a political upset by deciding neither completely for the 
Federalist nor Republican interests and uses faulty logic in his reasoning, I suggest that, 
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taken in context with the way Marshall viewed the Constitution, his decision was not so 
much a political statement against the Jefferson Administration as it was an argument in 
favor of the Constitution. Early commentators in the nineteenth century focused on the 
case’s finding that Marbury deserved his commission, and scholars later interpreted the 
decision as a political coup, arguing that Marshall decided the case in the manner in 
which he did because of his Federalist politics. I do not deny the influence his politics 
had on his opinion, but I suggest that they are only one factor. Marshall’s opinion is best 
seen through the perspective of his life in its entirety.  
Marbury v. Madison is studied for the lasting legacy of judicial review it bestows on 
the Court. But Marbury does more than codify that single power. It formalizes the 
supremacy of the Constitution, it elevates the judiciary to a level more equal to the other 
two branches of government, and it is a lesson in moderate, pragmatic politics. It is 
through a reading of certain elements of John Marshall’s life that these lessons and 
lasting impressions are revealed, and the landmark case Marbury v. Madison becomes even 
more fundamental to the structure of American democracy.  
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CHAPTER TWO: John Marshall 
 
I: Family and Friends 
  John Marshall (1755-1835) was the eldest of fifteen children born to Thomas 
Marshall (1730-1803) and Mary Randolph Keith Marshall (1737-1809). The future Chief 
Justice credited his father with inspiring him to success.1 Thomas Marshall came from 
humble beginnings to become one of the largest landowners in frontier Virginia. Raised 
in Westmoreland County in the Virginia Tidewater, Thomas built a home in 
Germantown, in what would become Fauquier County. He was on the first list of 
magistrates appointed for the county court and also represented the county in the House 
of Burgesses, a position he would hold almost continually until the outbreak of the 
Revolution. An officer in the Virginia militia, Thomas Marshall was also a surveyor and 
agent for Lord Fairfax, proprietor of the “Northern Neck,” a huge grant of land between 
the Potomac and Rappahannock Rivers that began at the Chesapeake Bay and extended 
westward almost to the mountains. As was true for his friend, neighbor, and fellow 
surveyor George Washington, this association with Lord Fairfax provided Thomas with 
income and social standing. As agent for Lord Fairfax, Marshall not only surveyed his 
vast land holdings, but had access to his home. Washington and Marshall both took full 
advantage of the cultural resources there, including most prominently the large Fairfax 
library. 
 Like Washington, Thomas Marshall would become further involved in surveying 
the western frontier. As a result, he would become one of the largest frontier 
landowners, buying land both in Virginia and Kentucky. Thomas Marshall became one 
                                                 
1
 Jean Edward Smith, John Marshall: Definer of a Nation (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 
1996), 31 
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of Washington’s trusted advisors, paving the way for his son John to build upon that 
friendship. In 1781, the elder Marshall was appointed as surveyor of the western lands 
(Kentucky) by the new State of Virginia. With the ratification of the Constitution in 1787 
and the formation of the Union, Thomas Marshall was appointed by George 
Washington as Collector of Revenue for Kentucky. He held that post until 1797.2  
 On his mother’s side, John Marshall was directly related to the powerful Randolph 
family. Marshall’s maternal grandmother, Mary Randolph, was the eldest daughter of 
Thomas Randolph and Judith Fleming, known as the Tuckahoe Randolphs.3 After an 
indiscretion with an Irish overseer from a cousin’s plantation, Mary fell in love with the 
Reverend James Keith of Henrico Parish. After another indiscretion with him, Keith was 
banned from Virginia and exiled to Maryland. However, church authorities later 
rescinded the exile, allowing Keith to return to Virginia. When Mary came of age, she 
and Keith were married, a union that resulted in eight children, including John Marshall’s 
mother, Mary Randolph Keith. Controversy later arose as to whether the marriage was 
legitimate. Perhaps because of this scandal, Marshall did not often reference his 
connections to the influential Virginia Randolphs. It is also through Marshall’s maternal 
lineage that he was related to Thomas Jefferson (Thomas Randolph’s brother Isham was 
Thomas Jefferson’s grandfather.) Although they were blood relatives, John Marshall and 
Thomas Jefferson would become bitter political enemies. 
John Marshall’s life was heavily influenced by his father’s connections to Lord 
Fairfax. Not only was he exposed to intellectual and cultural resources of the Fairfax 
estate, but as a lawyer in Richmond after the Revolution, Marshall would often represent 
Fairfax interests.  
                                                 
2
 Ibid., 31 
3
 Ibid., 23 
 - 7 - 
II:  Marshall the Soldier 
 Perhaps the most influential experience in John Marshall’s life was that of being a 
soldier in the Continental army during the American Revolution. It was then that his 
leadership style truly flourished, his negotiation abilities developed, and most 
importantly, his belief in a strong central government took root.   
 Marshall enlisted in July 1775 in the local militia, and was made first lieutenant in the 
Fauquier rifles at the age of twenty. This division was a branch of the Culpeper Battalion, 
a minuteman unit that served in Williamsburg during the winter of 1775. As a member 
of this division, Marshall saw action at the Battle of Great Bridge on December 9, 1775. 
In the summer of 1776, the Virginia minutemen disbanded, but Fauquier County was 
allowed to recruit men to serve. Marshall was again commissioned as a first lieutenant, 
this time in the new Continental Army. Marshall’s company was assigned to the 
command of Colonel Daniel Morgan in the 11th Virginia Regiment. Most of Marshall’s 
army service from 1776 through1780 would be spent under Morgan’s command. In 
April and May of 1777 Marshall had the opportunity to work closely with Morgan, 
serving as his regimental adjutant. In September 1777, he again saw action in the Battle 
of Brandywine. But it was the hardships of Valley Forge during the winter of 1777-1778 
that set Marshall on the path to becoming a Federalist after the war. 4 
 Now a 22-year old lieutenant, Marshall quickly gained the respect of both his 
fellow officers and the men who served under him at Valley Forge.  Remarked one 
soldier, “He was an excellent companion, and idolized by the soldiers and his brother 
officers, whose gloomy hours were enlivened by his inexhaustible fund of anecdote.”5 In 
                                                 
4
 Ibid., 45 
5
 Joseph Story, “Chief Justice John Marshall’s Public Life and Services,” North American Review 26 
(January 1828): 8 
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letters written home to his family during the encampment at Valley Forge (and at other 
points during the war), Marshall rarely mentioned personal hardship.6 After the June 28, 
1778 Battle of Monmouth, Marshall was promoted to captain.  
In December of 1778, Marshall went home on furlough. This trip would prove 
to have a tremendous impact on him. At home, he witnessed first-hand the devastation 
and sacrifice that the war exacted from private citizens. He watched as his mother 
struggled to provide food for him and the French officers who had accompanied; he 
witnessed the extreme scarcity of foodstuffs and other essential supplies.7 He returned to 
the army in early May 1779, where he served as captain until his discharge in February 
1781.  
Marshall’s service in the army was one of the most important events of his life. 
When writing his biography of George Washington, his descriptions of the war were 
marked with a deep humanity and respect for the sufferings of war, not a bitterness that 
pervaded so many other soldiers.8 Marshall’s role in the war also propelled him into 
society. His relationship with Washington, though begun by his father’s pre-friendship 
with the general, was strengthened by his service, especially his stay at Valley Forge. 
Marshall was of the younger generation of Founders; he was not a signer of the 
Declaration or at the head of that political movement. Instead, his public career was 
born on the battlefield and in winter quarters. Like other of Washington’s young officers, 
Marshall built a post-war career upon his experience as a soldier.  
Perhaps the longest lasting influence that Marshall’s military service had on him 
was his belief in the need for a strong central government, one that could effectively 
                                                 
6
 Smith, John Marshall, 63 
7
 Ibid., 67 
8
 Ibid., 69 
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control and supply an army. In the post-war years he would champion a governmental 
structure that would have the power and resources to support the military and thus the 
country. It is also arguable that during the Revolution that Marshall’s patriotism began to 
develop into a national perspective in which the new United States superseded Virginia 
in importance.  
 
III:  Days at William & Mary 
Marshall received much of his early education at home, supervised by his father, 
who himself exhibited a passion for learning. Fortunately, the Marshalls had access to 
the library at the Fairfax estate. Marshall read the classics—Livy, Horace, Pope, Dryden, 
Milton, and Shakespeare—gaining the foundation for a legal education. At the age of 
twelve, he transcribed Alexander Pope’s Essay on Man, and learned most of it by heart.9 
In Pope’s work, Marshall was exposed to writings on the nature of man and the alliance 
between nature and reason. The profound influence these writings had on Marshall can 
be seen throughout his legal work, where he often relies on logic and reason for his 
arguments. Additionally, the style of Pope’s writing influenced Marshal, who paid close 
attention to the manner in which Pope styled sentences and the manner of Pope’s 
phrasing.10  
When he was fourteen, Marshall attended the Washington Parish academy, run 
by the Reverend Archibald Campbell. Both Thomas Marshall and George Washington 
had attended the academy as youths, and John Marshall was there a classmate with James 
Monroe. Marshall and Monroe would later serve together as officers in the Continental 
                                                 
9
 Max Lerner, “John Marshall and the Campaign of History,” Columbia Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 3 
(March 1999): 397 
10
 Smith, John Marshall, 34 
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Army, would attend law lectures at William and Mary together, and would serve together 
on the Virginia Executive Council11. Despite these common experiences, they would 
often find themselves in political opposition to each other, as Marshall would later take 
the lead of the Federalist Party, and Monroe, that of the Republican Party. 
As the American Revolution began to draw to a close, Marshall turned his sights 
towards a profession of law. He enrolled at William and Mary on May 1, 1780, and 
became one of forty young men who attended lectures on the law given by Chancellor 
George Wythe. While at William and Mary, Marshall prepared the standard notebook of 
legal terms and arguments that students of law prepared. The detail and thoroughness of 
Marshall’s notebook displays the time and care he spent on his studies. Indeed, Marshall 
would keep this notebook for the rest of his life, and refer to it often during his legal 
career.12 The notebook includes definitions of government and notes on the proper 
structure of arguments. It reveals the thought patterns of Marshall’s logical mind; how he 
thought through issues and lines of reasoning, and the way in which he was trained to 
prepare and construct arguments. His description under “Actions in General” is 
particularly illustrative: 
It is clear that for every injury a man shall have an action & for every right he has 
a remedy. Where a person has several remedies he may chuse [sic] which he 
pleases but in this he must follow the rules of that society of which he is a 
member, for tho’ [sic] a man has a right & is barred by the statute of limitations 
yet he can have no remedy.13 
 
Not only does this argument show Marshall’s approach to logic and argument structure, 
but the description of a person’s right to remedy is indicative of how he viewed the 
                                                 
11
 GaryHart, James Monroe (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2005), 12 
12
 Smith, John Marshall, 81 
13
 John Marshall, Notebook of Legal Terms, May 1780, John Marshall Papers, Earl Gregg Swem 
Library of the College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA, 9  
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courts. This idea of a right to remedy provided by the court would play a central role in 
Marbury v. Madison. 
 It is also at this time that Marshall read the work of influential legal scholars, 
including most notably Montesquieu and Hume. In Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws, 
Marshall was exposed to the doctrine of separation of powers, one that would influence 
the Framers of the Constitution. The ideology of separation of powers sought to limit 
legislative authority; this limit was made possible by an independent judiciary. Chancellor 
Wythe embraced this philosophy, and Marshall agreed.14 In David Hume’s Treatise of 
Human Nature, Marshall found a reinforcing ideology for his skepticism about natural law 
and a priori principles. Hume, like Pope, drew upon the value of experience, a principle 
that Wythe further impressed upon his students. Hume built upon the view that “stable 
property ownership was the foundation of a stable society.”15 To Marshall, this validated 
his deep belief that property was the basis for society and the ruling class. His familiarity 
with the Fairfax, Washington, and Randolph families no doubt prepared the way for 
these views.  
Marshall’s experiences at William and Mary were influential in other ways beyond 
academic. While a student, he was a member of Phi Beta Kappa fraternity. Some of his 
brothers there would go on to be leaders in the new American government. Marshall’s 
classmates included Bushrod Washington, who would serve on the Supreme Court with 
Marshall, and Spencer Roane, who would serve in the Virginia House of Delegates. Like 
the relationships he built as a soldier, Marshall developed friendships—as well as 
antagonistic relationships—with men he would serve and work with throughout his life. 
After he finished Chancellor George Wythe’s lecture series, Marshall secured his license 
                                                 
14
 Smith, John Marshall, 79 
15
 Ibid., 79 
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to practice law in Richmond in 1780. On August 28, 1780, he was then admitted to the 
bar in Fauquier County.16 After leaving the army in 1781, Marshall alternated his time 
between his home at Oak Hill Plantation in Prince William County and the new capital at 
Richmond. In 1781, Marshall married Mary Willis (Polly) Ambler, a daughter of the 
affluent Ambler family who had moved to Richmond from York County after the War. 
Through his connection to the Amblers, Marshall gained access to the highest levels of 
Virginia society and the politicians in the new state capital. Marshall now stood poised to 
become a major member of the Richmond bar.  
 
IV: Practicing Law; Seeking an Independent Judiciary 
 Even marriage to a daughter of so prominent a family as the Amblers could not 
guarantee John Marshall’s success as a Richmond lawyer. Nor could his family’s blood 
connections and social ties to several other first-tier families, his service as one of 
Washington’s young officers during the War for Independence, or the contacts he had 
made in the army and at William and Mary insure success. Those and other factors 
merely set the stage. As it turned out, Marshall’s spectacular career as a lawyer owed 
much to the “Revolutionary Settlement” that followed the successful struggle for 
independence from Great Britain. For Marshall, the primary means for attaining wealth 
and celebrity during those years were cases involving the recovery of debts and cases 
dealing with American claims to land.  
In 1777, the Virginia General Assembly had passed a Sequestration Law, under 
which citizens could pay all or part of the debts they owed to British creditors into a 
                                                 
16
 Albert J. Beveridge, Frontiersman, Soldier, Lawmaker, vol. 1 of The Life of John Marshall, (New 
York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1916), 164 
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state loan offices.17 Virginians later would contend that payments made to that state loan 
office discharged their debts to British creditors. Virginians also claimed exemption from 
British debts under a 1782 act that stated no debt due to a British creditor would be 
recoverable in the state of Virginia unless the debt was assigned before 1777 (that is to 
say, before the Sequestration Act.) However, the 1783 Treaty of Paris included a 
condition whereby British subjects would be allowed to recover debts from Americans in 
American courts.18  Would these cases be tried in the state courts of the state in which 
the citizen resided? Or, because they were debts addressed by the federal Treaty of Paris, 
would they be heard in the new federal district courts? As these courts began to hear 
debt cases, John Marshall, now a young lawyer in Virginia’s new capital in Richmond, 
became a star and the most sought after lawyer in Virginia by 1790.19   
 The Virginia courts were closed to cases during 1780 and 1781. After the Treaty of 
Paris of 1783, however, they were not only open, but their dockets became clogged with 
cases concerning American debts to British creditors and also questions over claims to 
land in the newly independent United States. In 1782, Thomas Marshall was appointed 
to the state survey office for the Kentucky Territory. John Marshall served as the 
intermediary between his father’s office and investors.20 His experience with land 
investors and survey claims brought many clients who had dealings in land claims to his 
practice. 
 Marshall also benefited from his new father-in-law’s prominent status in Virginia. In 
1782, Jaquelin Ambler served as the state treasurer. Marshall himself was elected to the 
                                                 
17
 Charles F. Hobson, “The Recovery of  British Debts in the Federal Circuit Court of Virginia, 1790 to 
1797,” The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 92, No. 2 (April 1984): 177 
18
 Ibid., 179 
19
 Ibid., 183 
20
 Smith, John Marshall,  90 
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Council of State in November 1782. As a result, clients who had business with the state 
would come to Marshall, increasing his law practice in the meantime.  
 While in Richmond, Marshall benefited from the presence of other prominent 
Virginia lawyers, especially John Wickham and Edmund Randolph. Wickham was a 
prominent attorney in Virginia and one that would frequently serve as opposing council 
to cases Marshall would argue. Wickham and Marshall participated in many of the same 
social clubs and events; their houses (both of which survived the great fire of 1865) were 
located only a few blocks away from each other, thus facilitating their entertaining of 
guests and clients, often from the same social pool. But Wickham and Marshall’s houses 
are physical manifestations of their very different personalities. Where Wickham used his 
wealth to impress his guests and illustrate his power and influence, Marshall’s house 
reflected his pragmatism. Marshall’s Richmond home was solid and well built, like his 
reputation. He did not live cheaply: his furnishings were of the highest quality. But he 
was not ostentatious. Visitors to the home of the future chief justice left impressed by 
Marshall’s intelligence and rationality.21 
 Marshall was perhaps most influenced by Edmund Randolph, the attorney general, 
(briefly) secretary of state, and Governor of Virginia in 1786. A cousin on his mother’s 
side, Randolph assisted Marshall in the early stages of his legal career and would 
ultimately expand Marshall’s client base enough to make him one of the most prominent 
lawyers in Virginia. When Marshall first moved to Richmond, he did not have chambers 
of his own; Randolph offered Marshall the use of his chambers during the beginning 
days of his practice. Randolph had risen to prominence as an attorney and received many 
of his clients from his—and Marshall’s—cousin Thomas Jefferson when Jefferson 
                                                 
21
 Visit to John Marshall House, Richmond, VA (September 25, 2009) 
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shifted his primary focus to politics in 1774. When Randolph became governor in 1786, 
he handed his clients over to Marshall. Ironically, Jefferson’s legal practice became 
Marshall’s.22  
 Marshall would continue to practice law until his appointment as chief justice, all the 
while participating in state and national politics. In 1783, a case would come before the 
council of state when Marshall was a sitting member that would reveal how the future 
chief justice felt about constitutional supremacy. Though he was not a participating 
lawyer in the case, Marshall’s opinion in what became known as the Posey Affair offered 
a preview of his later legal reasoning in Marbury v. Madison. 
 A case entitled Commonwealth v. Canton came before the Virginia state court a mere 
three months before the Posey Affair. This case involved a conflict between the Treason 
Act, passed by the Virginia legislature in 1776, and the Virginia state constitution. A 
complicated case, the basic conflict arose from the fact that the Treason Act gave the 
power to pardon a person from treason to the legislature, whereas the constitution gave 
that power to the governor. As attorney general, Edmund Randolph made the case for 
constitutional supremacy. He argued that the constitution represents the will of the 
people and should therefore be enforced over the will of the legislature. This argument 
in favor of constitutional supremacy over legislative acts was not lost on Marshall, who 
was one of the many interested attorneys who witnessed the oral arguments.23  
 In 1783, Virginia Governor Benjamin Harrison presented the council of state with 
an allegation of misdeeds against a New Kent County magistrate, John Price Posey. 
Marshall was a sitting member of the council at the time. To Marshall, the investigation 
raised questions of judicial independence. Marshall’s belief in the separation of powers 
                                                 
22
 Smith, John Marshall, 90 
23
 Ibid., 94 
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argument, as espoused by Montesquieu, led him to strongly favor an independent 
judiciary that was free from executive interference. To the future defender of the judicial 
branch, the executive’s interference in the judiciary was inappropriate, and could be 
construed as the executive attempting to unfairly influence the decisions of the court. 
Commonwealth v. Canton, and the argument for constitutional supremacy, was still fresh in 
the minds of the members of council. Marshall seized the opportunity, in the recorded 
minutes of the council meeting, to declare unconstitutional the act of the legislature 
authorizing the council to proceed in the investigation. This was the first recorded 
instance in the history of the United States that an act of the legislature was struck down 
because it violated a constitution.24 
 In 1786, Marshall would argue his first major case before the Virginia court of 
appeals. Hite v. Fairfax was a case involving property rights and contract law, not 
constitutional supremacy. In 1735, Virginia Governor William Gooch had issued a 
patent to Jost Hite for 54,000 acres of land. The patent conflicted with an earlier royal 
grant that was given to Lord Fairfax. In 1741, the British Privy Council granted rights to 
the land to Lord Fairfax. Hite presented a set of surveys to Fairfax, who had agreed to 
issue patents to Hite, but Fairfax then declined to issue the patent on the grounds that 
Hite’s claim was to inaccessible lands. In 1749, Hite sued to secure a title to the land. In 
1769, the general court ruled in favor of Hite. They established a commission of seven 
who would examine Hite’s survey and determine proper ownership. The commission of 
seven included Thomas Marshall. In 1771, the commission report was filed, and the 
government issued a final decree and both sides filed an appeal to Britain’s Privy 
Council. The outbreak of the American Revolution led to a break in the litigation, but 
                                                 
24
 Ibid., 95 
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the case was placed again on the docket of the Virginia court of appeals in 1780. The 
case finally came before the court until April 29, 1786.25  
 John Marshall was council for the Fairfax estate along with attorney Jerman Baker. 
Despite having inherited Randolph’s cliental, Marshall argued against Edmund Randolph 
who served as council for Hite alongside attorney John Taylor of Caroline. The oral 
arguments stretched on for six days. Randolph, arguing for Hite, stressed the equity 
claim rather than the rules of property, stating that ruling in favor of Hite would create a 
level of equality between rich and poor. Baker, in defense of the Fairfax estate, claimed 
that Hite was trespassing, and that his claim to the land came from an unauthorized 1735 
act of the defunct colonial government. Hite’s claim was no longer valid under the new 
American government. Taylor, for Hite, took a different approach. He questioned the 
legitimacy of the original royal grant given to Fairfax. The grant, he claimed, was made 
and confirmed by Charles II and James II when neither of them were actually on the 
throne, and therefore was not a legitimate grant. The final word lay with Marshall. He 
argued that a reasonable man would have been prompted to have searched into the title, 
which would have served notice to the purchaser.26 Unlike the attorneys before him who 
relied on emotional appeals to the gap between rich and poor or the technicalities of 
whether a king had the appropriate authority to award a land grant, Marshall invoked 
Coke and Blackstone to provide a basis in legal theory as to why Fairfax had legal rights 
to the land, regardless of political passions. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found in 
favor of Hite, but they did also stipulated that Marshall’s argument had merit and that 
the Fairfax estate could convey lands to purchasers.27 
                                                 
25
 Ibid., 105 
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 Ibid., 106 
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 Hite v. Fairfax 
 - 18 - 
 The results of Hite v. Fairfax were very significant, for Marshall’s argument took a 
significant step towards securing property titles for Americans in the Northern Neck.                   
The case also led to a tremendous amount of litigation, with many clients seeking out 
Marshall specifically. The dramatic increase in revenue not only allowed Marshall to 
better support his family, but also allowed him to increasingly participate in politics. His 
participation in such a prominent case also cemented his position as a leading Richmond 
attorney.28 It is interesting to note that Marshall later purchased lands from the Fairfax 
estate himself. Marshall’s arguments do not appear to be colored by any personal interest 
he may have had in the land at the time, and it could be the case that Marshall’s interest 
in the land occurred after he argued the case. But more than just promoting his 
reputation, Hite v. Fairfax more permanently developed Marshall’s support for private 
property and what would become his overall judicial philosophy. His experience with 
this case in particular influenced how he would later interpret the Contract Clause of the 
Constitution during his tenure as chief justice.29 
 In addition to taking on cases that dealt with claims to the Fairfax estate, Marshall 
also became a prominent lawyer in the British debt cases. Virginia was one of the states 
with the highest debt to British merchants, and as a result, witnessed an extensive 
amount of litigation addressing British debt recovery claims.30 Marshall, in his personal 
belief supporting honoring terms of a legitimate contract, saw the failure to pay debts as 
giving Britain too much power over the newly independent United States. Though he 
was often retained as council for Virginia debtors, Marshall was firmly on the side of 
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contract compliance.31 His deep involvement with the British debt cases would 
definitively shape the way he would interpret the Contract Clause of the Constitution. 
 After the ratification of the Constitution, Marshall continued with his law practice, 
but now there was a new court structure with which lawyers had to contend. In the 1790 
case Bracken v. College of William and Mary, Marshall defended his alma mater against the 
threat of government control. In this case, Marshall argued for the independence of 
private educational institutions against interference by the government. This case would 
serve as the basis on which he would later decide the 1819 case Trustees of Dartmouth 
College v. Woodward.32 The 1793 case, Ware v. Hylton, was yet another British debt case. 
This case was unique, however, in that it was the only case Marshall ever argued before 
the Supreme Court over which he would later preside as Chief Justice. Ware was used as 
a test case for the supremacy of the Constitution: it questioned whether the federal 
Treaty of Paris was superior to a Virginia state law regarding the collection of British 
debts. Marshall partnered with Patrick Henry to represent the defense: Henry employed 
his theatrical oratory skills and Marshall brought his superior legal reasoning.33   
Marshall believed strongly in the right to private property and in upholding the 
terms of a contract. He also believed firmly in a strong national government, one that 
would protect private property rights and would have the resources and authority to 
support the military. In order to protect those rights to private property and to support 
the strong national government, Marshall placed his faith in the supremacy of the 
Constitution. But in order to fully uphold the Constitution, Marshall argued the need of 
the courts to have the power of judicial review. The courts must be the branch to 
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interpret statutory law and insure that it did not violate the terms of the Constitution. 
And, in keeping with the theory of separation of powers to which Marshall subscribed, 
an independent judiciary was the bedrock of maintaining constitutional supremacy, thus 
private property rights and the national government.  
 While Marshall was establishing himself as one of the most prominent lawyers in 
Virginia, he was simultaneously pursuing a political career.34 In 1782, Marshall was first 
elected to the Virginia House of Delegates. During this time, he served with leading 
Virginia figures such as Patrick Henry, George Mason, Richard Henry Lee, John Tyler, 
and James Monroe. Monroe, like Marshall was also serving his first term.35 After serving 
only one term in the House of Delegates, Marshall was elected to the council of state at 
the age of 27 (Monroe, too, was elected to the council the same year after only serving 
one year in the House.) Though both Marshall and Monroe were young, it was not 
unprecedented to have young members sit on the council of state.36 It was during this 
time on the council of state that Marshall articulated the opinion for which he most 
remembered—the supremacy of the constitution—on the Posey Affair. 
 Marshall was reelected to the House of Delegates in 1787 and quickly moved to 
correct the issue that had been at stake during the Posey affair. He introduced legislation 
that would repeal the original statute that gave authority to the council to investigate the 
conduct of judges. Demonstrating the influence both of Montesquieu’s political theory 
established in his The Spirit of the Laws and the instruction Marshall received as a student 
at William and Mary under Chancellor George Wythe, Marshall asserted that the power 
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the council held to investigate the conduct of judges violated the independence of the 
judiciary.37  
 
V: Struggle over the Constitution 
 Marshall had already laid a foundation for his opinion on the supremacy of the 
constitution while a member of the Virginia House of Delegates. It was, however, during 
the fight for ratification of the United States Constitution that he would emerge as both 
a leader of the Federalist Party and as a staunch defender of the government under the 
Constitution, especially the judicial branch. After the Constitutional Convention in 
Philadelphia concluded and a draft of the document was produced, the individual states 
held their own ratification conventions. Despite the provision that nine of thirteen states 
were needed to ratify the document for it to become effective, it was widely 
acknowledged that Virginia, for political reasons, needed to be one of those states to 
ratify. Virginia was one of the most politically powerful states in the Union, possessing 
both a large population and substantial economy. While technically a Southern state, 
Virginia is geographically towards the northern section of the Southern region; as such, it 
helped create a bridge between the mid-Atlantic and Southern states.  
 Marshall entered the ratification convention with his mind already made up to 
defend the Constitution. He already had a strong devotion to national unity, rising 
primarily from his experiences in the military.38 For Marshall, the key to a successful 
democracy—and independence in general—was an independent judiciary. It is in the 
fight for ratification that Marshall, who would become the leading defender of the 
judiciary, made apparent his support of an independent system of courts. 
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 Before the questions of the judiciary and the constitution itself could even be 
debated, a convention had to be called. And it was none other than Marshall who 
proposed it. In October 1787, the House of Delegates passed Marshall’s resolution for a 
ratification convention.39 But the Constitution was in trouble from the beginning in 
Virginia. Partisan lines were drawn quickly and firmly. Many of the leading Anti-
Federalists, who argued against the Constitution both at the Philadelphia convention and 
during the ratification process, were leading Virginians. They feared that the document 
produced in Philadelphia took too much power from the states and gave it to a central 
government that would become oppressive and squash individual freedoms, much like 
the royal government they had just fought so hard against.  
 Patrick Henry led the Anti-Federalists in protesting the Constitution at the Virginia 
state convention. On June 5 and 7, 1788, Henry launched into his series of speeches 
against the Constitution. His speeches were based on the emotional appeal to the fear 
that so many Americans held: that the Constitution would create a central government 
so strong it would be as oppressive as the monarchy against which they had just rebelled. 
Appealing to every man in the room, Henry claimed 
here is a revolution as radical as that which separated us from Great Britain. It is 
as radical, if in this transition our rights and privileges are endangered, and the 
sovereignty of the States be relinquished: And cannot we plainly see, that this is 
actually the case…This acquisition [of the Constitution] will trample on your 
fallen liberty: Let my beloved Americans guard against that fatal lethargy that has 
pervaded the universe: Have we the means of resisting disciplined armies, when 
our only defence, the militia is put into the hands of Congress…This 
Constitution is said to have beautiful features; but when I come to examine these 
features, Sir, they appear to me horridly frightful. Among other deformities, it 
has an awful squinting; it squints towards monarchy: And does not this raise 
indignation in the breast of every American?40 
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Henry spoke early in the Convention, setting the tone against ratification. He argued 
against the very provision that Marshall felt so justified a strong central government: the 
ability to efficiently regulate and supply an army.  
The Federalists were well aware of their opposition and the battle that lay before 
them. The series of arguments now known as The Federalist Papers were written in defense 
of the Constitution in New York, but Virginians were reading them as well. James 
Madison, the “Father of the Constitution” and a Virginian himself, was one of authors 
of The Federalist Papers and the Virginia Federalists were well armed with the arguments in 
favor of the proposed constitution.41  
 The debates over the Constitution continued back and forth for days, with 
prominent leaders speaking on both sides. On Tuesday, June 10, the debate between 
Marshall and his childhood friend Monroe began. Monroe addressed the convention 
first, arguing against ratification in a speech filled with lofty metaphors about Ancient 
Greece. Marshall addressed the delegates next. Marshall relied not on historical 
metaphors like Monroe or fiery, emotional appeals like Henry, but rather on his carefully 
honed legal skills. He delivered an argument in favor of ratification that rested on logic 
and reason and, as a result, resonated with the many lawyers present at the Convention.42  
 The Monroe-Marshall debates may not have been the deciding moment at the 
Convention, but they are important for two reasons. First, they demonstrate Marshall’s 
legal prowess. His carefully reasoned arguments would become his trademark. At the 
Convention, he established himself as a legal force to be reckoned with and a voice for 
the Federalist Party. Second, the debates demonstrate the first real division between 
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Marshall and Monroe. They had grown up together and had similar experiences serving 
in the military, studying at William and Mary, sitting in the House of Delegates, and as 
members of the Council of State. But now their paths would diverge. Monroe would 
become an active player in the Anti-Federalists (later the Republican) party, and Marshall 
would be a leader in the Federalist. The differences between Marshall and Monroe help 
to explain why, on a larger scale, Marshall would differ politically from most of his fellow 
Virginians. 
 Marshall distinguished himself at another point during the Convention: the debate 
over Article III—the Judiciary Article. Marshall had already signified himself as a strong 
defender of an independent judiciary in the Posey Affair. Now he would defend the 
branch he would one day lead. Mason and Henry both argued that the state courts 
should be enough; that a federal judiciary would take power away from the states and 
trample state and individual rights. When Marshall responded to Mason and Henry, he 
laid out another carefully reasoned argument. Marshall called the judiciary the defender 
of the Constitution and of individual liberty. He chided the Anti-Federalists for claiming 
the Court would become a tool of oppressive government.43 In a moment that almost 
foreshadowed his future decision in Marbury v. Madison, Marshall explained that because 
Congressional powers were delegated by the Constitution, “If they were to make a law 
not warranted by any of the powers enumerated, it would be considered by the Judges as 
an infringement of the Constitution which they are to guard. They would not consider 
such a law as coming under their jurisdiction. They would declare it void.”44 By arguing 
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the unnamed power of judicial review, Marshall demonstrated how an independent 
judiciary was the bulwark of a democracy and the guardian of personal freedom.  
 On Wednesday, June 25, 1788, after several rounds of voting, Virginia became the 
tenth state to ratify the Constitution. Although the Constitution had technically gone 
into effect with the ratification by New Hampshire (the ninth and last state needed to 
officially adopt the Constitution), Virginia’s ratification sent a strong political message 
that the Constitution would be recognized as the supreme law of the land.  
 
VI: Politics in the New Nation 
 Marshall emerged from the Convention with a new reputation. He was now not only 
an accomplished lawyer, but a staunch defender of the judiciary and a leader in the 
Federalist Party. In 1789, Marshall was appointed US Attorney General for Virginia 
under the Washington administration. He turned down the position, however, because 
his law practice was doing exceedingly well. In the summer of 1794, he was appointed as 
Virginia’s acting attorney general during James Innes’s absence from the state.45  
In 1796, Marshall was reelected to the House of Delegates. During this term the 
Fairfax cases were still before the courts. Marshall himself filed suit on behalf of the 
estate, touching off litigation that would ultimately result in the 1816 Supreme Court case 
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, from which Marshall, as sitting chief justice, would recuse 
himself.46 Also in 1796, Marshall was again offered a post by the Washington 
administration, as Minister to France. Marshall declined the nomination on the grounds 
of not wishing to be away from Polly and his family for such an extended period of time 
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(the post would ultimately go to Charles Cotesworth Pinckney).47 Despite refusing the 
position as Minister to France, Marshall would be named as part of the delegation that 
was sent to France in 1797 under the Adams administration to negotiate better relations 
with the Revolutionary French government after the controversial Jay’s Treaty with 
Britain. It would be this trip that would end in the legendary XYZ Affair. 
 
VII: The XYZ Affair 
America in the early federal period was struggling not only with domestic issues, 
but also to create a reputation of respect among foreign nations. The mission to France 
on which Marshall served was not the first attempt to improve the tenuous Franco-
American relations. During the American War for Independence, the French and 
Americans signed the Treaty of 1778, pledging French money and French military 
support for the American Cause. Historically an enemy of England, France viewed the 
revolt of Great Britain’s North American colonies as an opportunity to weaken their 
ancient opponent and possibly gain a future ally against England. Despite the assistance 
the French gave towards the American victory, the United States was not quick to 
support the French Revolution when in 1789. Though the French verbally espoused 
many of the same ideals as the American Revolution, many Americans were unsettled by 
the violence, including especially the killing of the monarch.48  
 American politics during the Washington and Adams administrations took an 
increasingly anti-French tone. By the time John Adams assumed the office of the 
presidency, hundreds of American ships had been commandeered by French privateers 
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in the West Indies and elsewhere, and the problem was only escalating.49 Domestically, 
Federalists and Republicans were split over how to proceed with French relations: 
Federalists looked for a way to sever the relationship, while Republicans feared that the 
Federalist administration would succeed in ending the French alliance. Towards the end 
of his administration, Washington had moved towards a more hostile position towards 
the French; his successor Adams continued that trend. On May 15, 1797, Adams 
convened a special session of Congress to address the increased French hostilities on the 
open seas. In his address, Adams described the French demands for a new American 
minister to be sent to France and French indignities towards Americans. He called for 
the nation to defend itself, saying “[s]uch attempts ought to be repelled with a decision 
which shall convince France and the world that we are not a degraded people, humiliated 
under a colonial spirit of fear and sense of inferiority, fitted to be the miserable 
instruments of foreign influence, and regardless of national honor, character, and 
interest.”50 
In 1797, President John Adams appointed three emissaries to France—Charles 
Cotesworth Pinckney from South Carolina (already been serving as American envoy in 
France), Elbridge Gerry from Massachusetts, and John Marshall—to sail to France to 
negotiate cessation of maritime hostilities with the new French Directory. Pinckney had 
arrived in France much earlier after his appointment as Minister to France. Marshall 
sailed to the Netherlands to await the arrival of Gerry, arriving in The Hague on August 
                                                 
49
 William Stinchcombe, “The Diplomacy of the WXYZ Affair,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 
Vol. 34, No. 4 (Oct. 1977): 590 
50
 John Adams, Speech to Congress on May 16, 1797 regarding the XYZ Affair. 
http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/P/ja2/speeches/jaxyz.htm (accessed April 14, 2010) 
 - 28 - 
29, 1797. Pinckney traveled to meet Marshall in Amsterdam, and the two spent early 
September waiting for Gerry to arrive.51  
Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, Bishop of Autun, or simply Talleyrand 
as he is more commonly referred, was an influential figure in both the French Directory 
and the negotiations of the XYZ Affair. Talleyrand was intimately familiar with the 
American political landscape as a direct result of his time spent in American as an 
émigré. In 1792, Talleyrand first fled from France to England, then sailed to the United 
States in February 179452. He then spent the next two years living in the United States, 
where he became familiar with the political climate of the day, as well as engaging in land 
speculation and befriending many of the leading political figures, including Secretary of 
War General Henry Knox53. Talleyrand returned to France in 1796, after the end of the 
Terror. Upon his return, he was elected to the Institut National, where he produced two 
papers on North America and its relations with Britain. In these papers, he argued that 
the United States and Britain were naturally linked by culture, language, and finances, 
and stated that if the United States were to end its policy of neutrality it would more than 
likely form an alliance with Great Britain54. After writing the papers on North America, 
Talleyrand succeeded Charles Delacroix as the foreign minister in 179755.  
Talleyrand recognized that the French relied upon their commercial interests 
from their colonial possessions in the French West Indies. An all out war with the 
Americans might cut off trade and naval access to their colonial possessions, thus further 
damaging a French economy that was experiencing rampant inflation. The French 
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“could see no political goal that would justify war with the United States. If war did 
break out…supplies to the French West Indian colonies would be cut off and the United 
States would probably enter into a virtual alliance with Great Britain.”56 Another point 
that Talleyrand brought up in his reports, and the issue he would then open negotiations 
with, was that of American President John Adams’ May 16, 1797 speech to Congress, 
which the French found offensive.57 
 After submitting his papers to the Directory, Talleyrand returned to the American 
envoys. As a preliminary to negotiations, Talleyrand demanded an explanation for 
President Adams’ speech. The Americans refused to provide the explanation. Marshall 
recorded in the Paris Journal that the envoys “read the Presidents speech & were of the 
opinion that explanations could only be demanded on the conclusion which states his 
determination to adhere to the system already adopted & to the engagements already 
made.”58 The following events are typically those that are referred to as the XYZ affair. 
After the Americans’ refusal to explain the Adams speech, Talleyrand then left the 
envoy. Some days later, an intermediary by the name of Jean Conrad Hottinguer visited 
the Americans. Hottinguer was to be referred to as “X” in the American correspondence 
sent home. Hottinguer explained that members of the Directory were upset about 
President Adams’ speech and wanted to be calmed down. He then stated that 
negotiations would not begin until the Americans had paid for damages against the 
French government, given a substantial loan to the French government, and provided an 
“additional pot de vin of £50,000 to Talleyrand—a bribe to soothe the thirsty throat of 
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government.”59 This was the initial bribe demanded that so outraged the Americans. 
Marshall recorded the event in his Paris Journal, saying “M. Horttinguer [sic] …said 
he… it is money; it is expected that you will offer money: we said we had spoken to that 
point very explicitly: we had given an answer…it is no, no, not a six pence.”60 A second 
man, Pierre Bellamy, Talleyrand’s personal banker, came to visit the emissaries. He 
would become “Y” in the Americans’ correspondence. He repeated the demands. A 
third intermediary for Talleyrand later visited the Americans, Lucien Hauteval. Hauteval 
would be referred to as “Z” in the Americans’ correspondence. He also explained that 
the loan and money for Talleyrand were a prerequisite to doing business with the 
Directory. The Americans refused the demands, and wrote a lengthy statement to 
Talleyrand in January 1798, reemphasizing American neutrality and of American claims 
against France.61 The French request for bribes outraged the Americans; it was seen as 
both disrespectful of American sovereignty and immoral.  
 While Marshall was in France, he had witnessed the chaos that became the trademark 
of the French Revolution. Initially he refrained from judging a people striving for liberty 
and democracy, but his mind changed as he became exposed to the violence he found in 
Paris.62 In letters home, he could not help but condemn the breakdown of authority and 
the failure to protect individual rights and legal proceedings regarding the individual: 
“the same violence in equal opposition to the constitution is practic’d [sic] on a minority 
of the executive & on several citizens whose only offense was that they had printed free 
comments on the conduct of the [D]irectory & of the armies. These excesses cannot 
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have been necessary.”63 Marshall’s experience in France reinforced his belief in an 
independent judiciary that could not be suppressed by a political regime. His 
contributions to the negotiations deepened his Federalist loyalties, as he saw first-hand 
what chaos could arise from unchecked mob rule. And it is through his experiences in 
France that his loyalty to Washington, Adams, and Federalist policies is strengthened. 
 
VIII:  Federalist Hero 
 After Marshall returned from France, his popularity soared. The American public 
was outraged over how the French treated the Americans, and as result the American 
representatives were hailed as heroes who stood up for the morality and liberty of the 
young republic. The positive press Marshall received from the XYZ Affair helped launch 
his career into national politics.  
 Yielding to Washington’s requests that he run for public office again, Marshall 
returned to Richmond after a visit at Mount Vernon and declared his intent to run for 
Congress.64 Marshall ran against John Clopton, securing a margin of victory by 114 votes 
on April 24, 1799.65 Representing Richmond, Marshall had garnered support from many 
Republicans. Despite having established himself as a supporter of President Adams and 
Federalist policies in general, he was a leading moderate in the House of 
Representatives.66  
 Marshall entered the House of Representatives when the Sixth Congress convened. 
In a House that was quickly dividing into political factions, Marshall emerged as a leading 
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Federalist, especially as a result of the Nash Affair. In 1799, the Republicans accused 
President Adams of executive malfeasance because he had decided to extradite sailor 
Thomas Nash (alias Jonathan Robbins) to Great Britain for trial on charges of mutiny 
and murder. Republicans claimed Adams inappropriately interfered with the judiciary in 
ordering the extradition, as the Constitution gave the Courts jurisdiction over cases 
involving extradition.67 Republicans brought forth a measure in Congress to censure 
Adams. In a move that would establish him as a leader of the Federalist Party, Marshall 
quickly came to the President’s defense. In a communication printed in the Virginia 
Federalist on September 7, 1799, Marshall defended the President’s actions as within the 
terms of the Treaty of Amity between the United States and Great Britain. He argued 
that though the judiciary does have authority over questions involving treaties, this 
question in particular demanded action by the executive, and thus “the President appears 
to have done no more than his duty.”68  
Marshall had again constructed an argument in defense of Adams that showed 
Marshall’s keen mind and emphasis on logic and reason. He argued that the Executive 
was the one branch of government empowered to proceed in foreign relations, but that 
he is not the only actor. The president, Marshall continued, is bound by acts of 
Congress. In another demonstration of constitutional supremacy, Marshall stated that 
under the Constitution, acts of Congress can be considered as supreme law of the land. 
Adams was acting within the confines of the Treaty and also the acts of Congress, and 
thus did not act inappropriately. 
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Marshall was duly rewarded for his loyalty to the president. In 1800, Adams 
appointed him to the office of Secretary of War, succeeding James McHenry.69 Marshall 
only held this position for a few months, as he was quickly appointed as Secretary of 
State after Timothy Pickering vacated the office. The offer of Secretary of State was 
attractive to Marshall. For one thing, the position would bring him an increased income. 
But Marshall’s eagerness to return to foreign affairs after his experience in Paris was the 
ultimate motivation behind his acceptance of the nomination.70  
As Secretary of State, Marshall cemented his leadership within the Federalist 
Party. Employing his consensus-building skills, one of his greatest challenges was to 
maintain some degree of cohesion between the high Federalists and the more moderate 
Federalists. Marshall’s duties as Secretary of State dealt with the operations of the federal 
government. The construction of the new capitol, Washington City, was one of the main 
duties of which he had to oversee.71 The arena of foreign policy was remarkably quiet. 
The conflict with the Barbary pirates—a problem that would ultimately come to a climax 
during the presidency of Thomas Jefferson—had not yet become a major concern. The 
British subjects continued to press for payment of debts owed them by American 
citizens, and Marshall’s extensive involvement in the British debt cases made him 
extremely knowledgeable about the problem and thus well prepared to deal with the 
issue as Secretary of State. In France, Napoleon was on the ascent as emperor, but the 
series of wars with Great Britain and her allies had not yet begun in earnest.  
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Marshall’s rise to leadership in the Federalist Party, especially as occupant of high 
office within the federal government, seems unusual given that he was a Virginian. One 
would have expected him to be influenced by regional interests and become, like his 
cousin Thomas Jefferson, a leading Republican. Instead, he advocated for a strong 
national government and the supremacy of the United States Constitution over state 
constitutions. It was his involvement in the several levels of politics that ultimately 
informed his political ideology. His service in the Continental Army created his support 
for a government strong enough to supply and command the military. His tenure in 
Virginia politics helped him construct his arguments for constitutional supremacy. His 
part in the ratification of the Constitution cemented his support of an independent 
judiciary as the cornerstone of liberty. His contributions in France furthered his belief in 
a central government strong enough to defend against chaos. When Marshall became a 
leader in the Federalist Party and in the national government, these political ideas came 
together and formed his political ideology.  
Marshall’s differences with other leading Virginians can be attributed to other 
factors as well. Washington served as a primary mentor to Marshall. With his father’s 
relationship with the Virginia farmer, Marshall’s own service under the general, and his 
biography The Life of Washington, Marshall’s political ideology was shaped by Washington. 
While Washington was neither declared as Federalist nor a Republican, his leanings 
clearly tended towards the Federalist side. This shaped Marshall’s views. Some of 
Marshall’s other Virginia colleagues, most prominently James Madison and James 
Monroe, were mentored by Thomas Jefferson. They were thus influenced by his ideals 
and subscribed to his views. This was not the case for Marshall. Though perhaps partly 
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fueled by his dislike for Jefferson, Marshall’s support for the Federalist cause was 
undoubtedly influenced by his mentorship from Washington.  
Foreign policy created another divide between Marshall and his Virginia 
brethren. While most of the Virginia coalition supported a stronger relationship with 
France, Marshall continually advocated repairing ties with Britain. After Marshall’s 
experience in Paris, this antagonism towards France was even greater, and the divide him 
and Virginia Republicans even sharper. 
Marshall’s personal economic status developed a connection between him and 
Federalists of New England and the Mid-Atlantic States. Marshall was not a large 
plantation owner like many of his Virginia counterparts. While he did possess quite a bit 
of land, he never attempted large-scale agriculture. As a result, he did not have the 
agrarian interests in common with other Virginia representatives. As a lawyer, he was 
much more business minded, like the Northern Federalists. Marshall also had a different 
view of debt than the Virginia gentry. Marshall also saw firsthand the negative impact of 
the large debts accumulated by the landed aristocracy from his position as an attorney in 
the center of the British debt cases.72 All of these factors would shape the political 
ideology of the fourth Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.  
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CHAPTER THREE: Marbury v. Madison 
 
I: The Election of 1800 
Marbury v. Madison arose from one of the most significant presidential elections in 
American history. To understand how Marshall’s life impacted the opinion he wrote, one 
must first have an understanding of the case he was deciding and the political nuances 
involved. The political environment surrounding the Election of 1800 was hardly one of 
calm, national unity. Washington had stepped down from the presidency in 1796, and in 
his Farewell Address, he warned against political factions. Yet, deep political lines had 
been drawn between the two parties that had developed since the creation of the 
Constitution: the Federalists, with their belief in a strong national government and desire 
to build good relations with Great Britain, and the Democratic Republicans (also 
referred to as the Jeffersonian Republicans, or simply the Republicans) who supported 
states rights at the expense of a weak federal government and building better relations 
with revolutionary France. In 1796, Washington’s vice-president John Adams had been 
elected president, with the Republican Thomas Jefferson serving as his vice-president. 
 President Adams was highly unpopular. Lacking Washington’s diplomatic personality 
and general presence, Adams was unable to hold together the bickering members of his 
cabinet. His policies were as unpopular as his disposition. The Alien and Sedition Acts, 
signed into law in 1798, were viewed as censorship and against the very principles of the 
Revolution. Perhaps what contributed most to his unpopularity, though, was his support 
of the Jay’s Treaty. 1 
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 In 1794, President Washington asked John Jay to lead negotiations with Great 
Britain, in an attempt to solve lingering issues after the Revolution, including British 
presence on the frontier, conflicts regarding trade, and the recent practice of British 
seizure of American sailors and ships. The treaty was ultimately a failure for the 
Americans. When the terms were made clear to the Congress in Philadelphia, it was 
obvious where the opposition would rise. The Americans had given up almost every 
point to the British in return for next to nothing. While the British had agreed to remove 
their troops from the frontier, an agreement which they would not completely honor 
until the end of the War of 1812,2 the treaty failed to address the issues of trade and 
completely ignored the conscription of American sailors.3 Worse still, as scholars have 
pointed out, the treaty “accepted British economic superiority; it tolerated British naval 
supremacy; it failed to secure compensation to American slave owners for slaves 
kidnapped by the British during the Revolution; it refused to give any guarantee against 
the British navy’s practice of stopping American vessels to impress seamen; and 
it…tilted away from France and towards Britain.”4 The Republicans were completely 
opposed to the Treaty and even the Federalists were less than thrilled. Washington did 
lend his support to the Treaty, however, and after a brutal and bitter political battle over 
the Treaty, the Senate ultimately approved it in August, with Washington signing the 
Treaty into law on August 20, 1794.5 
 As Washington’s successor to the Presidency, Adams tried to maintain Federalist 
strength and influence. In choosing his cabinet, he held over the four department heads 
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from Washington’s cabinet in an attempt to continue Federalist harmony.6 This would in 
fact create more discord than harmony and the bitter political rivalries that had surfaced 
during Washington’s term would become more pronounced under Adams’s presidency. 
This would not be the only problematic note of the four years Adams served as 
president. A series of unpopular decisions, including the aforementioned Alien and 
Sedition Acts, his continued backing of Jay’s Treaty, and his refusal to support the 
French Revolution made him a very unpopular candidate for reelection in the Election 
of 1800. 
 Thomas Jefferson was by far the leading presidential nominee for the Republican 
Party during the Election of 1800. Adams, as the incumbent Federalist president, was the 
nominee for the Federalist Party. The campaign was brutal and marked by negativity. 
The previous three elections had been somewhat calm and peaceful; this election was 
anything but calm. Adams, already unpopular, was portrayed as a monarchist and a 
British sympathizer. Jefferson and Republicans played on unflattering views of Adams, 
describing how he would storm around shouting obscenities at his cabinet, “dashing and 
trampling his wig on the floor.”7 But the Federalists portrayed Jefferson as equally 
dangerous. His critics often attacked him regarding his religion, describing him as a man 
without religion who would lead the country into moral decline. Hamilton described his 
fears to Jay, calling Jefferson “an atheist in religion and a fanatic in politics.”8 The election 
was marked by negativity, leading to a general fear that if a Republican did win, there 
would not be a peaceful transition of power.  
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 The actual election was an example of masterful political maneuvering. The 
Federalists controlled the electoral votes in the New England States; the Republicans 
would hold the states in the South and the West. Jefferson predicted that the election 
would come down to the Mid-Atlantic states, suggesting that New York would most 
likely decide the election.9 The result of the April election in New York pitted Federalist 
Alexander Hamilton against Republican Aaron Burr. Burr was not as prominent as 
Hamilton nationally or as a nominee until the last stage of voting. With a superior 
political strategy, Burr and the Republican slate of candidates carried the New York City 
election, thus clinching the New York vote for Jefferson.10 The Federalists were thrown 
into chaos after the New York election. Hamilton began plans to undermine Adams’s 
position as the Federalist nominee by maneuvering for South Carolinian Charles 
Cotesworth Pinckney, the former Minister to France, to receive the Federalist electoral 
votes.11  
 By December 1800, the election had deteriorated into malicious personal attacks on 
every candidate, regardless of party. On February 11, 1801, the results of the electoral 
votes cast by the state presidential electors were revealed to the Senate, and revealed a 
problem: Jefferson and Burr tied for the number of votes, each with seventy-three 
votes.12 Pursuant to Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution, the tie vote then went to 
the House of Representatives, as “if there be more than one who have…an equal 
Number of Votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot 
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one of them for President.”13 Adams had not won reelection, and it was definite that the 
next president would be a member of the opposite party. The question was who? The 
House could no more easily decide the winner than the state electors. The first round of 
voting resulted in continued deadlock. The Federalists knew that they had lost the 
election and threw their support to Burr in an attempt to keep the presidency from the 
“fangs of Jefferson.”14 Hamilton then went to work. He focused on Representative 
James A Bayard, a Delaware Federalist. For two months he bombarded him with letters 
discrediting Burr’s Federalist positions. Finally, after thirty-five ballots cast in the House, 
Bayard submitted to Hamilton’s arguments and submitted a blank ballot, effectively 
removing the Delaware vote from Burr and deciding the election in favor of Jefferson. 15  
 In the one month between the final vote in favor of Jefferson and his inauguration, 
Adams would make several decisions that would profoundly influence the course of the 
early history of the republic. One of those came soon after Chief Justice Oliver 
Ellsworth resigned his position. Adams thus had to find a replacement. He turned first 
to former chief justice John Jay, who declined the position. He then had another name in 
mind. According to Marshall’s account of events, he and the outgoing president were 
discussing several issues in the president’s office, including the nomination of the 
Supreme Court chief justice, when Adams remarked “Who shall I nominate now?” 
Marshall replied that he did not know. Adams then stated “I believe I must nominate 
you.”16  
                                                 
13
 U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 1 
14
 Simon, What Kind of Nation, 122 
15
 Chernow, Alexander Hamilton, 637-638 
16
 Smith, John Marshall, 14 
 - 41 - 
 Marshall’s nomination may have been a matter of convenience, but he was also an 
appropriate choice for Adams.17 Both Adams and Marshall understood that there was a 
certain sense of urgency for Adams to make a nomination: with only a month left until 
Jefferson’s inauguration, Adams needed to act fast in order to take advantage of the 
vacancy to fill it with a Federalist justice. Marshall had been steadfastly loyal to President 
Adams, serving as an emissary to France during the XYZ Affair and Secretary of State. 
He was a staunch Virginia Federalist, a leader of the party, and a respected attorney and 
politician.18 Marshall had demonstrated a rational approach to policy issues, including a 
firm but modest opposition to the unpopular Alien and Sedition Acts, the ability to 
defend administration policies, and a “political acumen and good judgment” that earned 
him the respect of figures on both sides.19 Marshall may have been nominated because 
he was a convenient solution, but he had demonstrated a loyalty to the Federalist 
policies, a rational and sensible approach to politics, and a logical, intelligent 
understanding of law that made him not just a convenient, but a wise choice for 
nomination. The next day after Adams and Marshall had their discussion, Adams sent 
his nomination to the Senate. The nomination brought some unexpected resistance from 
the High Federalists, who hoped that Adams would withdraw the nomination in place of 
Justice William Patterson. But Adams held to his choice; Marshall was unanimously 
confirmed as the fourth chief justice of the Supreme Court of the United States on 
January 27, 1801. He would send a note a week later to Adams, offering the president his 
appreciation, saying  
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 I pray you to accept my grateful acknowledgements for the honor conferd [sic] 
on me in appointing me chief Justice of the United States. This additional & 
flattering mark of your good opinion has made an impression on my mind which 
time will not efface. I shall enter immediately on the duties of the office & hope 
never to give you occasion to regret having made this appointment.20 
 
 Marshall’s appointment as chief justice was not the only appointment Adams would 
make before he vacated the presidency. A series of justice of the peace positions were 
vacant and Adams did not want to lose the opportunity to fill them. On March 3, just 
one day before Adams was to leave the presidency, all forty-two nominations were 
rushed to the president for his signature. Adams’s intent was clear: he wanted to stack 
the judiciary with Federalist judges. In the wake of the recent change to Republican 
controlled executive and legislative branches, Adams viewed the judiciary as the last 
Federalist stronghold.21 The night before Jefferson’s inauguration, Adams sat signing 
commissions. A clerk waited to rush them back to Secretary of State Marshall, who held 
the position simultaneously with chief justice for a brief period. Because of the chaos 
that ensued with the presidential turnover, not all of the commissions were delivered. 
One in particular, the commission for William Marbury, was entrusted to Marshall’s 
younger brother, James. James Marshall, who himself had been awarded a justice of the 
peace appointment by President Adams, took a batch of the commissions to Alexandria, 
Virginia. He would later be unable to recall for certain whether or not he had taken the 
commissions for Marbury, or his three other fellow future plaintiffs, in particular.22  
 The events of March 4, 1801 marked a revolution in another sense. Twenty-five 
years earlier, a group of men declared their right to representative government free from 
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oppression. On March 4, 1801, they realized the success of their revolution. The 
peaceful transfer of power from one party to another after an election signaled to the 
country—and the world—that this experiment might very well succeed. But the 
Revolution of 1800—as Jefferson termed the election—had another, less pronounced, 
meaning. As Chief Justice John Marshall administered the oath to President Thomas 
Jefferson, a subtler revolution was occurring. For after the tenures of Marshall and 
Jefferson in their respective positions, neither office would look the same. 
 On March 2, 1801, Jefferson wrote to Marshall requesting a favor of the Chief 
Justice. “I propose to take the oath or oaths of office as President of the U.S. on 
Wednesday the 4th [of March] at 12. o’clock in the Senate chamber. May I hope the favor 
of your attendance to administer the oath?”23 Marshall responded in the affirmative, 
writing “I shall with much pleasure attend to administer the oath of office on the 4th, & 
shall make a point of being punctual.”24 Jefferson and Marshall both knew the precarious 
political situation at hand. Long time foes, each respected the other’s political abilities. 
Marshall knew the extent of Jefferson’s influence; Jefferson was well aware of Marshall’s 
legal abilities and his leadership among the Federalists. The significance of Marshall 
administering the oath of office to his political enemy was not lost to either man. Both 
Marshall and Jefferson recognized the need for political unity after the long and bloody 
election. Jefferson’s inaugural address presented a theme of reconciliation between the 
two political factions. In addition to the famous phrase “We are all republicans; we are 
all federalists,” Jefferson went on to say  
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 If there be any among us who wish to dissolve this Union, or to change its 
republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with 
which error of opinion may be tolerated, where reason is left free to combat it. I 
know, indeed, that some honest men fear that a republican government cannot 
be strong, that this government is not strong enough…I believe this, on the 
contrary, the strongest government on earth…Let us, then, with courage and 
confidence, pursue our own federal and republican principles, our attachment to 
union and representative government.25 
  
In his speech, Jefferson attempted to address the Federalist belief that a strong central 
government was the only way to preserve the union. He attempted to soothe the fears of 
Federalists like Marshall by reminding them he would not disintegrate the Union, that he 
would not pursue a solely French alliance, and that he would preserve the government 
and the strength of the nation.26 
 Despite Jefferson’s attempts to encourage an early form of bipartisanship, he and 
Marshall were setting the foundation for a legal and political showdown. Jefferson had 
an agenda when it came to the executive branch, but with Marshall sitting in the 
Supreme Court, he knew the Chief Justice would be watching his every move. Marshall 
knew that in order to limit Jefferson’s intent to lead the country down a decidedly 
Republican path he would need to use the Courts as a tool to temper Jefferson’s power. 
As scholars have described, “whereas Jefferson viewed the federal courts as centralizing, 
partisan obstacles to his republican vision, Marshall considered them bulwarks of union 
and protectors of law and, not incidentally, private property from irresponsible 
debtors.”27 As Marshall and others well knew, Jefferson viewed the Courts as weak and 
powerless. Marshall’s leadership experiences had prepared him for this battle: his ability 
to gain consensus would be put to the test in creating majorities on the Court to combat 
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the Executive. Marshall knew he had two objectives: to strengthen the Supreme Court 
and to limit Jefferson’s power. Marshall’s success at these objectives would come 
through his pragmatism. His entire life had developed his pragmatic nature: now that 
rational and logical mind would be put to the test.  
 
II: Marbury v. Madison 
After Jefferson was inaugurated in 1801, he learned of the remaining 
commissions from Adams’s Midnight Appointments. As James Madison would not take 
office as Secretary of State until May, Jefferson sent instructions to his attorney general 
Levi Lincoln to withhold the remaining commissions. Since they were signed by the 
outgoing president, Jefferson felt no need to distribute the commissions. After ordering 
the commissions withheld, Jefferson then attempted to combat Adams’s attempt at 
stacking the federal judiciary with Federalist judges. He replaced the list of forty-two 
appointments with thirty of his own.28 As a result of both the shorter list and Jefferson’s 
refusal to deliver the remaining commissions, several of Adams’s nominations for 
justices of the peace did not receive their commissions. Among those nominations was 
William Marbury, a Georgetown businessman and a loyal Federalist.29 In early 1801, 
Marbury sought to recover his undelivered commission. He turned to Charles Lee, the 
former Attorney General under Presidents Washington and Adams, who filed a request 
with the Supreme Court for a show-cause order for a writ of mandamus.30  
Before one can appreciate the issues at the center of Marbury’s case and the 
lasting impact of Marshall’s decision, one must understand the structure of the federal 
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court system in 1801. The early Supreme Court of the United States was not a force of 
power. It was instead a weak institution, with little prestige, and justices had to be 
convinced to serve. Questions often arose regarding the extent of the Court’s power, the 
processes, and the ability of Congress to influence—or control—the judicial branch. The 
Constitution left the judicial branch in a decidedly inferior position to the other two 
branches. Article III of the Constitution gives only the basic framework of the federal 
court system. This was mainly a result of compromise between the framers at the 
constitutional convention. Fears that a federal judiciary would overwhelm and suppress 
state courts created conflict over just what would be established as the Supreme Court. 
The Constitution is a political document, the result of political compromises made at the 
Convention. As a result, the judicial branch was quite vague. The judiciary would 
develop through actual practice and through further legislation by Congress and 
Marshall’s opinion in Marbury was a major landmark in that process.  
 In 1789, after the Constitution had been ratified and George Washington had been 
sworn in as the first president, the federal courts barely existed. The Supreme Court was 
essentially the only level of the federal court structure in existence. And even that body 
was skeletal. The Constitution had laid out only the barest of provisions for the Court in 
Article III. It established the authority of the Court, dividing it between Original and 
Appellate jurisdiction. Under Original jurisdiction, the Court had authority “in all Cases 
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State 
shall be Party.” Under its Appellate jurisdiction, the Court had the power “in all the 
other Cases before mentioned” referring to the specified cases involving  
all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the 
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their 
Authority,—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies 
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to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or 
more States;—[between a State and Citizens of another States;—] between 
Citizens of different States,—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands 
under Grants of different States, [and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, 
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.] 
  
This was a very limited mandate, describing only a few specific types of conflicts. In 
addition, there was at yet no lower court structure. The First Congress knew that one of 
their first obligations would be to craft legislation establishing the rest of the federal 
court structure and expand upon the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. 
 The Judiciary Act of 1789 established the lower federal courts and expanded the 
Supreme Court. Where the Constitution allowed for Congress to determine the number 
of justices who would sit on the Supreme Court, the Judiciary Act fulfilled that 
requirement by stipulating that one chief justice and five associate justices would sit on 
the Supreme Court. The Judiciary Act also established the term of the Court, creating 
two sessions—one commencing in February and the other in August.31  
 The Judiciary Act further sketched in the rest of the federal court structure. Section 2 
established the original thirteen districts; Section 3 established the District Courts in each 
of the aforementioned districts and the sessions that court would be held (each court 
was to hold four annual sessions). Section 4 established the Circuit Courts of Appeal; 
Section 5 established when the circuit courts would be in session. Other sections of the 
Judiciary Act laid out the specific details regarding the oaths a justice would swear, the 
order of seniority between justices, the procedure for convening quorum on the 
Supreme Court, and detailed the powers and jurisdiction of the district and appeals 
courts.  
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 Section 13—the portion of the Judiciary Act at issue in Marbury v. Madison—
addressed the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, reiterating mostly those cases identified 
by the Constitution as being under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, but also 
expanding them. It reads 
And be it further enacted, That the Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction 
of all controversies of a civil nature, where a state is a party, except between a 
state and its citizens and except also between a state and citizens of other states, 
or aliens, in which latter case it shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction. 
And shall have exclusively all such jurisdiction of suits or proceedings against 
ambassadors, or other public ministers, or their domestics, or domestic servants, 
as a court of law can have or exercise consistently with the law of nations; and 
original, but not exclusive jurisdiction of all suits brought by ambassadors, or 
other public ministers, or in which a consul, or vice consul shall be a party. And 
the trial of issues in fact in the Supreme Court, in all actions at law against the 
citizens of the United States, shall be by jury. The Supreme Court shall also have 
appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts and courts of the several states, in 
the cases herein after specially provided for; and shall have power to issue writs 
of prohibition to the district courts, when proceeding as courts of admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction, and writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles 
and usages of law, to any courts appointed or persons holding office, under the 
authority of the United States.32 
  
While Section 13 reiterated the Court’s original jurisdiction, it also expanded the Court’s 
power, allowing it to issue writs of prohibition and writs of mandamus. The Constitution 
did not explicitly give that power to the Supreme Court, but the Judiciary Act of 1789 
did. This difference in assigned powers would become problematic for Marshall, and 
would be the center of his focus in his written opinion in Marbury. 
In 1801, Congress had passed the Judiciary Act of 1801 (also often referred to as 
the “Midnight Judges Act.”) The 1801 Act attempted to correct and amend the Judiciary 
Act of 1789. The 1801 Act increased the number of judges in the lower district courts 
and, most notably, established the June and December terms of the Supreme Court.33 In 
1802, the Senate began to move to repeal the 1801 Judiciary Act. In its place was the 
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Judiciary Act of 1802. The 1802 Act substituted legislation that made three major 
changes to the Supreme Court: first, it required each of the justices to ride circuit. 
Second, the 1802 Act abolished the June and December terms for the Supreme Court 
that had been established in the 1801 Act. Third, the 1802 Act restored the February, but 
not the August, term of the Supreme Court, a provision that was in the original 1789 
Judiciary Act.34 This rescheduling of Supreme Court sessions had the overall effect of 
cancelling sessions of the Supreme Court for the entire 1802 calendar year, meaning 
Marbury would have to wait until the Court resumed in February 1803.  
Marshall did his best to keep the judiciary out of the political battle between the 
High Federalists and the Republicans.35 The High Federalists were angered over the 
Republican 1802 legislation and wanted Marshall to void the act as unconstitutional. 
Since the next session of the Supreme Court would not be held until 1803, the 
Federalists mounted a different assault on the bill. In the fifth circuit—specifically that 
circuit since it was the one over which Marshall presided—arose the case Stuart v. Laird. 
The case involved an issue over a debt owed to Virginia resident Hugh Stuart by 
Maryland resident John Laird.36 After being decided in favor of Laird, Stuart appealed to 
the Supreme Court, where Charles Lee quickly challenged Marshall’s authority to hear 
the case under the new Judiciary Act of 1802 by claiming that Congress had no authority 
to order the justices to ride circuit. The case bore a similarity to Marbury in that the issue 
involved congressional legislation that expanded the powers of the Court.37 
 The Supreme Court finally resumed in February 1803, with two cases—Marbury v. 
Madison and Stuart v. Laird—at the top of its docket, both challenging the 
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constitutionality of Congressional legislation. Marbury was argued first. The principle 
issue at hand seemed to be whether or not Marbury had a right to his commission and 
whether or not the Court would force Madison to deliver the commission. Lee, on 
February 10, made his opening arguments demonstrating why the Court should issue the 
writ of mandamus. Madison, on the other hand, not only refused to respond to the 
show-cause order, he refused to attend the proceedings in any manner. His refusal 
indicated his low opinion of the Court’s authority.38  
 Because Marbury was suing under original jurisdiction, the Supreme Court operated 
as a trial court. One issue of concern was how Marshall’s position as former secretary of 
state would be treated, since he held the office when the commission was supposed to 
be delivered. Without the certified record of Senate confirmation for Marbury, Lee built 
his case on the testimony of the State Department clerks, leaving Marshall out of the 
questioning. Lee’s first witness was Jacob Wagner, the chief clerk for the Department of 
State. Wagner stated that he had been serving as Jefferson’s personal assistant at the time 
of the transition and that as a result, he had no direct knowledge regarding the justice of 
the peace commissions. Lee called Daniel Brent to testify next. Brent served as assistant 
to Wagner, and he testified that he had in fact seen the commissions but did not think 
they had been sent out and did not know what happened to them.39  
Lee’s next witness was Attorney General Levi Lincoln. Lincoln had replaced 
Marshall as the interim secretary of state the day after Jefferson’s inauguration while 
Marshall assumed his duties as chief justice. Lincoln claimed executive privilege, 
declining to state whether or not he was aware of Jefferson’s order not to deliver the 
commissions. Lincoln stated that though he respected the authority of the Court, he also 
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felt bound to maintain the rights of the executive and asked Marshall if his testimony 
was necessary. Marshall, understanding the position Lincoln was in, instructed Lee to put 
his questions to Lincoln in writing. Through Lincoln’s deference to the Court’s authority 
and Marshall’s respect of executive privilege, it was clear that each was trying to limit the 
potential conflict between the two branches.40  
 Closing arguments were made on February 11, after Lincoln took the witness stand. 
During his testimony, he answered three of Lee’s four inquiries (Lincoln declined to 
answer the fourth question of whether Madison ever had possession of the 
commissions, and Marshall upheld his denial by saying the question was immaterial.)41 
Lincoln testified that he had in fact seen the commissions and that they had been signed 
and sealed by President Adams, but he did not know if any of them were for Marbury; 
he also stated he did not know if any of the remaining commissions had been delivered, 
but believed none of them had.42 Lee then submitted a sworn affidavit from Marshall’s 
brother James that he had tried to deliver the commissions but had been unable to 
deliver some of them in Alexandria and had thus returned them to the State 
Department.43  
 After Lee’s closing arguments, Lincoln stated that he had not heard from Secretary 
of State Madison regarding his position. Marshall, however, was uncomfortable and 
upset that Madison had not made any statement or appearance in the case. To Marshall, 
this undermined the adversarial process that the Court was to protect, the process at the 
heart of the American legal system.44  
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 Having heard the facts of the case, Marshall was placed in a difficult position. Any 
decision he handed down would anger either the Federalists or the Republicans. If he 
decided in favor of Marbury, the Federalists would be pleased, but the Republican 
executive would perhaps not obey the order, revealing the Court’s lack of power and 
weakening any influence the judicial branch would preserve. Deciding in favor of 
Jefferson and the executive, however, meant rejecting the legitimate claim to executive 
privilege—an argument used by Lincoln during the trial both to avoid answering 
questions and also to defend the executive’s actions—and deciding against Marshall’s 
own party.45 In addition to the political consequences of Marshall’s decision, there were 
legal and constitutional ramifications. Taken in combination, Marbury and Stuart v. Laird 
represented the largest constitutional battle yet between the three branches, as both cases 
challenged the validity of specific acts of Congress. If Marshall issued the writ of 
mandamus, he legitimized the Congress’s right through the series of judiciary acts to 
change and direct the Court’s jurisdiction. But again, finding in favor of Marbury meant 
revealing the extent of the Court’s weakness, as the Executive would simply ignore the 
court order. This was the issue that Marshall had been preparing for his entire life: the 
independence of the judiciary from outside political influence.  
 
III: Decision of the Court 
The eleven thousand word opinion that Marshall handed down not only 
addressed the current political tension and the issue of judicial independence, but it 
changed the scope of judicial power in America.46 Marshall started the opinion by 
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addressing Lee’s three questions, albeit in a different order. Marshall began by stating 
that Marbury did indeed have a right to his commission. Marshall treated the 
commission as property, and thus responded to Marbury’s claim to his commission as 
though he is pursuing lost property.47 By not receiving his commission, Marbury’s right 
to his property was violated. Because Marbury’s commission was property, and Marshall 
read the Constitution as protecting property, Marshall held that Marbury did indeed have 
a legal right to remedy in pursuing his lost property, saying “[i]t is, then, the opinion of 
the Court [that Marbury has a] right to the commission; a refusal to deliver which is a 
plain violation of that right, for which the laws of his country afford him a remedy.”48 
But then Marshall deviated away from the questions posed by Lee. Marshall 
turned to the question of whether Marbury was entitled to the remedy he seeks from the 
Supreme Court, namely the writ of mandamus that would have forced Madison to 
deliver the commission. Marshall referred to the Judiciary Act of 1789, where it gave the 
power to the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus. Marshall described how the 
Secretary of State fit the description of a person holding office under the United States. 
But then he said that the Court cannot issue this writ: “if this court is not authorized to 
issue a writ of mandamus to such an officer, it must be because the law is 
unconstitutional, and therefore incapable of conferring the authority, and assigning the 
duties which its words purport to confer and assign.”49 The Court could not issue the 
writ because the law itself is unconstitutional. 
 From here, Marshall proceeded into the argument that gives Marbury v. Madison its 
lasting legacy. He cited the jurisdiction laid out for the Supreme Court in Article III, 
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Section 2 of the Constitution, and argued that the original jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court was fixed and specifically laid out in the Constitution. Congress could change 
appellate jurisdiction, but original jurisdiction was fixed. Marshall then argued that this 
was true because every clause in the Constitution is intentional, saying that “it cannot be 
presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and, 
therefore, such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it.”50 Because 
Marshall believed that everything written in the Constitution is intentional, the 
definitions of original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as laid out in Article 
III, Section 2 were specific and definite. The Judiciary Act of 1789 changed the Supreme 
Court’s original Jurisdiction, adding to it the power to issue writs of mandamus. Because 
the Constitution specifically defined the Court’s Original Jurisdiction and the Judiciary 
Act of 1789 increased it beyond that specific definition, the 1789 Act is therefore invalid. 
Marshal then stated that the power to “issue writs of mandamus to public officers, 
appears not to be warranted by the constitution.”51 If this was true, then the 1789 Act is 
contradictory to the Constitution. And if it was contradictory to the Constitution, could 
it be a valid law?  
In response to this question, Marshall asserted the supremacy of the 
Constitution, saying the “constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable 
by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts… a legislative act 
contrary to the constitution is not law.”52 Marshall’s argument was based on the tenant 
that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The Judiciary Act of 1789 was 
invalid because it contradicted the Constitution. Marshall here invoked the Supremacy 
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Clause found in Article VI, which stated that “this Constitution…shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby.”53 Because the 
Constitution is the supreme law, any legislative or other action must be in agreement 
with it: because the 1789 Act violated the Constitution by inappropriately increasing the 
Court’s Original Jurisdiction, it could not therefore be valid law. 
 Marshall then declared that the power to evaluate whether laws violate the 
Constitution belongs to the Supreme Court. In his famous line, he says “it is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is…if 
two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.”54 He 
asserted that the courts were the appropriate branch of the government to look into 
cases where conflict arises regarding the constitution. Judges take oaths to “discharge 
[their] duties agreeably to the constitution;” the framers thus intended for the courts to 
be the instrument of interpreting the constitution. In Article VI, the Constitution 
demands that the “judges in every State shall be bound thereby” thus directing all judges 
to uphold the supremacy and authority of the Constitution. Since judges swear this oath, 
the constitution must therefore be supreme to all other laws—if the Constitution is not 
the basis for all government then the oath itself is invalid and a mockery of law.55 
Because the Court was bound to uphold the Constitution, which is the supreme law, 
they therefore have the power of judicial review. The judiciary was the branch to 
interpret whether legislative or executive action is in line with the Constitution, and if 
that action did not align with the Constitution, the Court had the authority to declare law 
unconstitutional.  
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IV: Creating the Third Branch 
 Marbury v. Madison became such an influential case because it claimed for the Court 
the power of judicial review. But why was this case the one to become such a landmark 
decision? After all, Stuart v. Laird was argued before the Court at the same time as 
Marbury, and it too dealt with the issue of Congress changing the Supreme Court’s 
jurisdiction. Why Marbury instead of Stuart? The difference in the political parties 
involved in the cases was ultimately what led Marshall to use Marbury, not Stuart, as a 
power play for the Court. Stuart involved the Judiciary Act of 1801, which the Federalists 
also wanted to see overturned, but it did not directly involve the executive. The 1801 Act 
changed the jurisdiction of the courts, but in that case, the Supreme Court deferred to 
Congress and allowed the change in jurisdiction. There were political reasons for this 
decision: Marshall fully understood that if he used Stuart to assert the Court’s power of 
judicial review, he would not have the opportunity to strike at the Executive.56 In 
addition to establishing the power of judicial review, Marshall wanted a way to censure 
the Republican executive. The players in Stuart did not involve prominent government 
officers from the executive branch as Marbury presented. 
 So the question arises: did Marshall have his mind made up of how he wanted to 
decide the case before he even heard the arguments in Marbury? Because Stuart and 
Marbury were heard at the same time, it is not unrealistic to infer that Marshall looked at 
the cases to see which one would make a stronger impact and would better serve his 
purpose. It seems clear that Marshall was looking for a way to reign in Jefferson and the 
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Executive branch.57 Marshall personally did not like Jefferson, but as a Federalist, he was 
also concerned about Republican policies not being checked. With Secretary of State 
Madison being involved in one of the cases, it seemed more advantageous to use Marbury 
v. Madison as the vehicle to check the Executive.  
 By looking at the language Marshall actually uses in the decision, it can be inferred 
that he truly believed in his claim that Section 13 of the 1789 Judiciary Act was 
unconstitutional.58 The manner in which he lays out his argument and the principles 
upon which he makes his claim support this idea. Marshall had a history of fighting for 
the supremacy of the Constitution and the independence of the judiciary. It is not 
unreasonable to deduce that Marshall was not simply writing the political coup of the 
century, but that he actually believed in what he was writing. He did believe that Section 
13 of the 1789 Act was unconstitutional and that the power to decide that status lay with 
the Court. He did believe that the key to a successful democracy lay in an independent 
judiciary, with the power of judicial review.  
 It is through this context that the claim can be made that the “Revolution of 1800” 
was not simply limited to the electoral politics of the day. The revolution that occurred 
when Jefferson was elected extended to the judiciary. When Jefferson moved into the 
White House, Adams put Marshall on the Supreme Court bench and instigated the 
Judicial Revolution of 1800. Because Marshall was looking for a way to restrain Jefferson 
he reinforced the supremacy of the Constitution as a limit upon the government. The 
Republicans in office could not undo all that the Federalist administrations of 
Washington and Adams had accomplished if they too were all subject to the 
Constitution and Marshall’s watchful eye. In asserting this supremacy, Marshall created a 
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revolution of his own. Never before had the Court asserted its own power in the manner 
Marshall did in Marbury. Marshall revolted against the executive and legislative attempts 
to suppress the judiciary through its multiple legislative acts and asserted that, through its 
power of judicial review, the Court was an equal branch of the government. 
 In deciding Marbury v. Madison the way he did, Marshall revealed more than just a 
brilliant legal mind and recognition of a political opportunity to strengthen the judiciary. 
He demonstrated a sense of pragmatism and rationality that had been developed through 
the course of events during his life. Marshall’s Federalist politics were no secret. Marshall 
had not only been influenced by leading Federalists such as George Washington, but had 
spent his entire political career defending Federalist policies. When he served in the 
Virginia House of Delegates during the Constitutional Ratification Convention, he not 
only advocated for Virginia to ratify the Constitution, but he emerged from the 
proceedings a leading Federalist. His career in national politics found him defending 
Federalist policies both at home and abroad. In the XYZ Affair, Marshall defended 
President Adams and his administration against negative French attacks and resisted the 
demands for bribes. When the French demanded an explanation for the negative 
comments Adams had made regarding the French, Marshall came to the president’s 
defense, refusing to allow the French to demean the young United States by forcing 
them to explain their actions. Marshall continued to serve as the defender of the 
Federalist administration while in Congress, delivering a speech on the floor of the 
House of Representatives that defended President Adams and his policy decisions 
against Republican criticism over the Thomas Nash affair. Marshall’s finding that 
Marbury had a right to his commission supported the Federalist intention to fill the 
courts with Federalist judges after the Election of 1800 put the Republicans in control of 
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both the Congress and Presidency. And in light of the Federalist fears that Jefferson and 
the Republicans were going to dismantle everything the Federalists had worked so hard 
to institute, Marshall was clearly aware that he was the leading Federalist in a position to 
truly have an influence on reigning in Jefferson’s political agenda. Marshall knew, 
however, that simply deciding the case in favor of Marbury and directing the executive to 
deliver his commission would not actually reign in Jefferson. The president would simply 
refuse to deliver the commission, thus revealing the true weakness of the Court. If 
Marshall’s weakness were exposed, then there would be no check on the Republican 
policies that could come forth. 
But it is inaccurate to say that Marshall’s sole motivation for deciding the case 
the way he does is because of his politics. Indeed Marshall did display his Federalist 
leanings in saying that Marbury had a right to his commission and chiding the executive 
for not delivering what was rightfully Marbury’s. But Marshall also clearly understood 
the delicate relationship that was being forged between the executive and the judiciary. 
After the bitter election of 1800, Marshall was using his position to help bring the 
country back to a place of calm and unity. By deciding firmly for either the Federalist or 
Republican position, Marshall could have further unleashed bitter partisan attitudes. 
Instead, Marshall worked for unity and an effective government. This desire was 
manifested during the trial process: Marshall did not push Attorney General Lincoln to 
answer whether or not he knew for certain if Jefferson had ordered the commissions to 
be withheld. Marshall’s own personal experience in the Executive branch as Secretary of 
State had taught him first-hand the necessity of respecting executive privilege. By 
respecting Lincoln’s claim for executive privilege, Marshall revealed that his desire for a 
functioning government surpassed his personal political beliefs. This act of putting his 
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political beliefs second demonstrates that the decision in Marbury is more than just a 
political coup.  
Instead of making a direct political statement for the Federalist Party, Marshall 
seized the opportunity to garner power for the Supreme Court. His language in the 
decision was not rife with bitter political claims; rather it demonstrated a cool logical 
approach to the decision. He based his decision in law, reason, and Constitutional 
clauses, not partisan ideology. In this, he revealed a practical and rational approach to the 
law that he had cultivated throughout his education and his legal career. In claiming the 
power of judicial review to make the Supreme Court an equal branch of the government, 
Marshall revealed the influence of William and Mary Chancellor George Wythe and the 
philosophers he read while in school. Montesquieu’s argument in favor of separation of 
powers clearly influenced Marshall in his claim that it is the power of the Courts to 
interpret the Constitution, not the legislature or the executive. Blackstone’s arguments 
on the hierarchy of law reinforced Marshall’s belief in the supremacy of the Constitution. 
Alexander Pope’s language and style in his Essay on Man helped Marshall develop his 
own legal writing style. In the opinion of Marbury, Marshall structured his argument in a 
very logical way: the Judiciary Act of 1789 creates a power contradictory to the 
Constitution. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Therefore, the power 
created by the Judiciary Act of 1789 cannot be valid. The end of Marshall’s written 
opinion demonstrates his logical reasoning. He lays out, in one sentence, the principle he 
asserts in the case, stating, “Thus the particular phraseology of the constitution of the 
United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all 
written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as 
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well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.”59 This type of logical structure 
was a skill that Marshall developed throughout his legal career, but was first introduced 
to during his early education. 
Marshall’s legal career explains how he finds in favor of Marbury but also why he 
asserts the role and independence of the judiciary. Finding that Marbury had a right to 
his commission was not simply motivated by his Federalist politics. Marshall, throughout 
his career, advocated for the upholding of contracts, the honoring of debts, and the 
protection of private property. His central role in the British debt cases after the 
Revolution developed his belief in honoring contracts and debts. Marshall was a leading 
attorney in the plethora of British debt cases that arose subsequent to the Treaty of Paris 
of 1783. As such, Marshall’s view of debt was well known: debt was no different than a 
typical contract, meaning it too should be honored. The case of Ware v. Hylton 
demonstrates Marshall’s approach to the debt cases. Marshall invoked the Contract 
Clause of the Constitution, demonstrating not only his consistent belief in upholding the 
terms of a contract, but also reinforcing the supremacy of the Constitution. In the same 
way that American debtors had to uphold the terms of the contract with British 
merchants, Jefferson’s administration should uphold the contract with Marbury. The 
commission granted to Marbury was like a contract and thus, for Marshall, should be 
honored.  
Marshall’s personal experience with the Fairfax estate—from his involvement in 
the land title cases, his personal holdings, and his father’s early role as Lord Fairfax’s 
agent—developed within him a sense that private property should be protected. The 
influence of the Fairfax property on Marshall—and thus on his decision in Marbury—is 
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notable. Not only did he receive an early exposure to the great philosophers of the age as 
a result of his father’s access to Fairfax’s library, but Marshall’s participation in the legal 
cases rising from the claims to title developed his skills and beliefs as a lawyer. Marshall 
was retained as counsel for the Fairfax estate in the case Hite v. Fairfax, defending the 
Fairfax claim to the land. From Fairfax he developed a cohesive argument in favor of 
property rights as protected by law. In Marbury he invoked that same argument. 
Marbury’s commission was like property and thus should be protected. Because he was 
denied his property, Marshall draws the conclusion that he does indeed have some legal 
remedy to recover his commission. 
 Marshall’s legal reasoning rested on the basis that the Constitution is the supreme 
law of the land and that the judiciary is to enforce that supreme law free of influence 
from either the legislative or executive branches. It is not difficult to see the influence of 
Marshall’s life on this argument. It comes as no surprise that Marshall based his opinion 
on the supremacy of the Constitution and the independence of the judiciary. He spent 
his entire legal and political career defending these principles. His service in the 
Continental army during the Revolution broadened his view of the powers and strength 
that should be held by the central government. The Continental Congress had little 
authority and power to adequately provide supplies and resources to the soldiers, leading 
to depravation that Marshall suffered first hand at Valley Forge. As a result, Marshall 
believed that the central government must have the power necessary to sufficiently 
provide for the military. This belief in a strong central government manifested itself in 
his judicial decisions through his argument for constitutional supremacy. The 
Constitution provided the government with its powers and rights and in order for that 
central government to have the necessary strength to provide for the country, no other 
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legislation or act could be paramount. Marshall’s tenure as an officer during the 
Revolution therefore directly impacted the decision he wrote in Marbury. As a student at 
William and Mary, he learned about the supremacy of law from George Wythe. He 
repeatedly defended the supremacy of the constitution as a member of the Virginia 
council of state. During the Posey Affair in 1783, Marshall invoked Edmund Randolph’s 
argument from Commonwealth v. Canton that the constitution represented the will of the 
people and should therefore be enforced over the will of the people. This experience is 
reflected in the language Marshall uses, stating “This original and supreme will organizes 
the government, and assigns to different departments their respective powers. It may 
either stop here, or establish certain limits not to be transcended by those 
departments.”60 Marshall fought vigorously for the ratification of the U.S. Constitution 
as a Federalist, and championed an independent judiciary as the defender of liberty in his 
arguments on the floor of the Virginia Convention. In the 1793 case Ware v. Hylton, 
Marshall argued before the Supreme Court that a federal treaty was superior to a Virginia 
state law because the Constitution made it paramount to state statutes. Marshall’s claim 
of constitutional supremacy is neither outlandish nor surprising. Rather, given his 
consistent defense of the principle throughout his career, Marshall’s landmark decision 
appears instead to be very understandable.  
Marshall’s defense of judicial review was hardly a new position for him. While on 
the council of state, Marshall used the opportunity presented in the Posey Affair to fight 
not only for the independence of the judiciary but also to declare a law invalid by 
contradiction of the Virginia Constitution. In his participation in the ratification debates, 
Marshall argued that the judiciary will be the body to guard against any legislative tyranny 
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over the states by declaring void any legislation that is unconstitutional. Marshall 
reiterates that sentiment in his opinion in Marbury, writing “[t]he powers of the legislature 
are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the 
constitution is written.”61 He employs the power of judicial review to defend the 
Constitution. But he also argues that this was not a power he was uniquely claiming for 
the Court, but rather one that was “apparent, that the Framers of the constitution 
contemplated that instrument as a rule of the government of the courts.”62Arguing for 
judicial review was not something that he wrote into the opinion to simply gain power 
for the Court in order to limit Jefferson’s administration and stage a political coup. The 
fact that Marshall had argued for this principle since the very creation of the 
Constitution demonstrates that this was a power in which he genuinely believed. That he 
would claim this right for the United States Supreme Court is no surprise.  
 Marshall’s personality and leadership is also relevant to how he shapes this decision. 
As an officer in the Continental army, he developed an easy, confident leadership style 
and was especially influenced by his tenure as adjutant to Daniel Morgan. His 
experiences as an officer in the Continental army developed his leadership skills and his 
reputation. Marshall then used those skills to lead the movement to ratify the 
Constitution. His influence in helping to ratify the Constitution jettisoned him to a 
position of prominence in the Federalist Party. His experiences in the Virginia legislature 
and the House of Representatives, as well as his central role in the negotiations in 
France, helped develop his ability to generate consensus. Marbury v. Madison was a 
unanimous decision, created so by his ability to create consensus among the justices. He 
broke with the traditional practice of each justice delivering an individual opinion, and 
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instead had the Court speak with one unanimous voice.63 Because of these leadership 
roles, Marshall was able to garner respect from his political colleagues. When he handed 
down his decision in Marbury his opinion was respected. But these leadership roles also 
demonstrate that his decision in Marbury was not just a political coup. Marshall had a 
long record of advocating for the supremacy of the Constitution and the independence 
of the courts. Therefore, his decision in Marbury codified a power of the Court he 
believed it possessed already.   
 Marbury v. Madison was a landmark case because it fundamentally changed the 
judiciary. This case is the foundation of the rule of law, of logic, of representative 
government, and of judicial independence. By asserting the right to judicial review, 
Marshall cemented a power for the Court that would make it a more equal player to the 
other two branches. Even more vital, however, is his argument for the supremacy of the 
Constitution. After Marbury, the Constitution’s place as the foundation for all other law 
was secured. But Marbury does even more than implement the doctrine of judicial review. 
It is a lesson in moderation: balance of politics between competing ideologies controlled 
by a rational and pragmatic chief justice who recognized the need for moderation. 
 
V: In the Aftermath of Marbury v. Madison 
When Marshall announced his opinion in 1803, many in the government and 
press viewed the decision more as a political coup and less as changing the very nature of 
the judicial branch. Marshall did not like Jefferson, but at this time the evidence suggests 
that both men were still trying to work for a united country. The bitter hostility that 
would develop between them after the Burr Treason trial in 1807 had not yet come to a 
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head. When the decision was issued, Jefferson did not comment publically or privately 
on the outcome, and it was not until many years later that he would express views that 
he was upset by the decision. 64 Marshall’s attack on Congress’s authority to change 
Supreme Court jurisdiction was not hailed as particularly partisan or controversial. In 
fact, most accounts of the case at the time completely ignored the claims to judicial 
review and instead focused on the statement in support of Marbury receiving his 
commission.65  
Republican press covered the decision in detail, with several papers printing the 
decision verbatim. The National Intelligencer, the New York Spectator, and the Aurora all 
devoted more than one issue to the case, focusing not on the lasting legal legacy of 
judicial review, but rather informing readers about the importance of the case while 
refraining from criticizing the case.66 Federalist papers, in contrast, covered the event in 
much less detail. The little praise that was printed focused expectedly on the decision in 
favor of Marbury, not that Section 13 of the 1789 was unconstitutional.67 After the initial 
decision was handed down, Marbury was largely ignored. Congress did not react strongly, 
and the Court restrained itself from overturning any legislation with which it simply did 
not agree.  
Despite the few political waves that Marbury stirred in 1803, it would become the 
foundation for many of the later Court’s monumental decisions. It can reasonably be 
argued, for example that without the assertion of judicial review in Marbury v. Madison, 
many of the mid-20th century civil rights issues would not have occurred. The next 
prominent case to bring judicial review back to the table was the 1856 case Dred Scott v. 
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Sanford. Chief Justice Roger B. Taney invoked the power of judicial review to declare the 
1820 Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, holding that the due process clause of the 
Fifth Amendment prevented the federal government from freeing slaves who were 
brought into federal territories.68 By using judicial review to overturn the Missouri 
Compromise, Taney effectively prohibited the federal government from preventing the 
spread of slavery to the western territories and states. Without the power of judicial 
review that Marshall asserted in Marbury v. Madison, the decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford 
would never have been decided the manner in which it was cast.69 
Other landmark cases rested on the power of judicial review as well, including 
the majority of the 1960s civil rights cases. Brown v. Board of Education (1954) used the 
Court’s authority to overturn state legislation as unconstitutional that allowed for the 
legal segregation of public schools for black and white children. The 1965 case Griswold v. 
Connecticut overturned a Connecticut law barring the use of contraceptives by married 
couples as unconstitutional by violating the right to privacy. While the subsequent 
abortion cases—including the 1973 case Roe v. Wade—were not strictly based on the 
power of judicial review, without that tool the Supreme Court could not have claimed 
the authority to find that different state statutes violated a constitutional right to privacy 
and were thus invalid. Even today, the power of judicial review is central to many 
arguments presented before the Court. Those who claim that the Second Amendment 
protects an individual’s right to own a firearm want the Court to invoke its power of 
judicial review to overturn state and municipal gun control statutes as unconstitutional. 
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Without the power claimed by Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, this argument would never 
exist.  
Marshall’s legacy does not extend just to domestic legislation and civil rights 
issues. It goes even further, as his argument for judicial review has spread internationally. 
The United States was the first modern democracy whose legislative body was checked 
by a judicial body.70 Great Britain maintained the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty 
and thus the doctrine of judicial review that was introduced in the United States was 
revolutionary.  But Marshall’s legacy was not to be confined to the United States. By the 
1920s, nearly all of the nations who had adopted some form of judicial review were in 
Latin America, namely Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, Mexico, Venezuela, and the 
Dominican Republic.71  
The end of World War I and the construction of new European constitutions in 
the aftermath of the war saw the first tendrils of judicial review spreading to Europe. By 
1920, judicial review existed in some form in Czechoslovakia, Austria and the Weimar 
Republic of Germany.72 It was not until the end of World War II, however, that judicial 
review would truly sweep through Europe and the rest of the world. With America 
emerging as a superpower after 1945, it had a strong hand in the reconstruction of 
European and former Axis-power nations’ constitutions. As a result, it exported the 
doctrine of judicial review to the rebuilding nations. Chapter VI, Article 81 of the 
Japanese Constitution names the Supreme Court as “the court of last resort with power 
to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act.”73 The 1949 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, created the independent Federal 
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Constitutional Tribunal, with the power to declare statutes null and void if they conflict 
with the Grundgesetz, the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany.74 Italy, the 
third member of the Axis powers, explicitly recognized the power of judicial review for 
acts of its national legislature; in 1956, it created a constitutional court to realize the 
practice of judicial review.75 
Judicial review continued to spread throughout the world as countries adopted it 
to protect minority rights. India adopted judicial review upon its independence from 
Great Britain in 1947 as a method of protecting its numerous ethnic and religious 
minorities from potential oppressive legislation. Canada established its own Supreme 
Court in the 1980s, complete with the powers of judicial review as a method of 
protecting minority rights, including those of the Quebecois. Two other nations adopted 
judicial review to protect minorities: Belgium, in the 1970s and 1980s established the 
Court of Arbitration to represent Flemish-speaking and French-speaking groups; and 
South Africa, in the era after the end of apartheid established judicial review in its highest 
court to protect both black and white interests.76  
 Other nations began adopting judicial review for their own political interests. In 
1958, France created the Fifth Republic, and created its Constitutional Court with the 
power to rule on an act’s “conformity with the Constitution.”77 Spain’s 1978 constitution 
re-established the power of judicial review from the 1930s; Portugal and Sweden both 
also adopted judicial review in the 1970s.78 Eastern Europe has also begun adopting 
judicial review, especially since the fall of the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia established a 
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Constitutional court in 1968, and both the Czech Republic and Slovakia maintain forms 
of the Court today; constitutional courts with the power of judicial review were also 
established in the former Soviet nations of Hungary (1990), Romania (1991), Lithuania 
(1992), Belarus (1994), Latvia (1996), and the Ukraine (1996).79 In 1991, even Russia 
established its own Constitutional Court, with the power of judicial review. It has taken 
an active stance towards executive actions, and has even withstood former president 
Boris Yeltsin’s attempts to destroy it by packing the court with new judges.80 
 Judicial review has spread to all corners of the world, from America to Europe, Asia 
to Africa, and even to Oceania. In 1985, New Zealand’s deputy prime minister proposed 
a Bill of Rights that included the power of judicial review that was remarkably similar to 
Marshall’s style of judicial review. There was, however, great opposition to this proposal, 
and ultimately the Bill of Rights was implemented with a much more limited form of 
judicial review.81 Whether or not New Zealand increases its powers of judicial review, or 
for that matter where Marshall’s legacy will spread next is a question that remains to be 
answered. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: Conclusion 
 
 Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison was not simply a political coup. Rather it 
was the culmination of his beliefs and experiences that led him to decide the case the 
manner in which he does. By viewing the opinion through the lens of his life, it becomes 
obvious that Marshall was not writing a political diatribe against the opposing political 
administration. He was sculpting the image and authority of the Court he thought 
instrumental for the promotion of American democracy.  
 The opinion in Marbury v. Madison contains many levels of meaning and influence, 
reflecting the many areas of Marshall’s life that impacted his decision. His experience in 
the Revolution led him to fight for a strong central government capable of supporting a 
military. He fulfills this need by strengthening the judiciary of the federal government. 
He establishes judicial review to elevate the judiciary as an equal branch of government 
because of his exposure to philosophers advocating for the separation of powers during 
his education. As a lawyer, Marshall repeatedly defended the upholding of contracts and 
the protection of property; as chief justice, he held that Marbury had a right to his 
commission because it was property. As a participant in the Ratification Convention, 
Marshall emerged as the leading advocate for the supremacy of the Constitution and the 
independence of the judiciary as the bulwark of freedom. By establishing judicial review 
in Marbury, Marshall fulfilled his argument for an independent court and cemented the 
Constitution as the supreme law of the land.  
American democracy is unique for a number of reasons, but primary among 
them is the existence of judicial review. The power of the courts to subject the acts of 
the other branches of government to scrutiny is a structural element that was first 
implemented through John Marshall’s pen. Though philosophers and legal scholars of 
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the Enlightenment had articulated the foundations of judicial review, it was not until 
John Marshall, in his capacity as Chief Justice, codified the theory that judicial review 
became a reality. Marshall’s vision of an independent judiciary and undying belief in the 
supremacy of the Constitution over all other law led him to use Marbury v. Madison as a 
tool to implement one of the defining features of American government. For Marshall’s 
legacy is more than just a definition of judicial review: it is the lasting success of 
American liberty. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A – Article III of the Constitution of the United States 
 
Section 1.  The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme 
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices 
during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a 
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office. 
 
Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under 
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under their Authority,—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers 
and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to 
which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more 
States;—[between a State and Citizens of another States;—] between Citizens of 
different States,—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of 
different States, [and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens 
or Subjects.] 
 In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in 
which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the 
other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both 
as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress 
shall make. 
 The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment; shall be by Jury; and such 
Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but 
when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the 
Congress may by Law have directed. 
 
Section 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against 
them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be 
convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, 
or on Confession in open Court. 
 The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no 
Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the 
Life of the Person attainted.  
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Appendix B – Marbury v. Madison [5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)] 
 
Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. 
At the last term on the affidavits then read and filed with the clerk, a rule was granted in 
this case, requiring the Secretary of State to show cause why a mandamus should not 
issue, directing him to deliver to William Marbury his commission as a justice of the 
peace for the county of Washington, in the district of Columbia. 
No cause has been shown, and the present motion is for a mandamus. The peculiar 
delicacy of this case, the novelty of some of its circumstances, and the real difficulty 
attending the points which occur in it, require a complete exposition of the principles on 
which the opinion to be given by the court is founded. . . . 
In the order in which the court has viewed this subject, the following questions have 
been considered and decided: 
1st. Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands? 
2d. If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his country afford 
him a remedy? 
3d. If they do afford him a remedy, is it a mandamus issuing from this court? 
The first object of inquiry is -- 1st. Has the applicant a right to the commission he 
demands? . . . 
It [is] decidedly the opinion of the court, that when a commission has been signed by the 
president, the appointment is made; and that the commission is complete, when the seal 
of the United States has been affixed to it by the secretary of state. . . . 
To withhold his commission, therefore, is an act deemed by the court not warranted by 
law, but violative of a vested legal right. 
This brings us to the second inquiry; which is 2dly. If he has a right, and that right has 
been violated, do the laws of his country afford him a remedy? 
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim 
the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of 
government is to afford that protection. [The] government of the United States has been 
emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to 
deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested 
legal right. . . . 
By the constitution of the United States, the President is invested with certain important 
political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is 
accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his own conscience. To 
aid him in the performance of these duties, he is authorized to appoint certain officers, 
who act by his authority and in conformity with his orders. 
In such cases, their acts are his acts; and whatever opinion may be entertained of the 
manner in which executive discretion may be used, still there exists, and can exist, no 
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power to control that discretion. The subjects are political. They respect the nation, not 
individual rights, and being entrusted to the executive, the decision of the executive is 
conclusive. . . . 
But when the legislature proceeds to impose on that officer other duties; when he is 
directed peremptorily to perform certain acts; when the rights of individuals are 
dependent on the performance of those acts; he is so far the officer of the law; is 
amenable to the laws for his conduct; and cannot at his discretion sport away the vested 
rights of others. 
The conclusion from this reasoning is, that where the heads of departments are the 
political or confidential agents of the executive, merely to execute the will of the 
President, or rather to act in cases in which the executive possesses a constitutional or 
legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only 
politically examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights 
depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear, that the individual 
who considers himself injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a 
remedy. . . . 
It is, then, the opinion of the Court [that Marbury has a] right to the commission; a 
refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right, for which the laws of his country 
afford him a remedy. 
It remains to be enquired whether, 
3dly. He is entitled to the remedy for which he applies. This depends on -- 1st. The 
nature of the writ applied for, and, 
2dly. The power of this court. 
1st. The nature of the writ. . . . 
This, then, is a plain case for a mandamus, either to deliver the commission, or a copy of 
it from the record; and it only remains to be enquired, 
Whether it can issue from this court. 
The act to establish the judicial courts of the United States authorizes the Supreme Court 
"to issue writs of mandamus in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to 
any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United 
States." 
The Secretary of State, being a person holding an office under the authority of the 
United States, is precisely within the letter of the description; and if this court is not 
authorized to issue a writ of mandamus to such an officer, it must be because the law is 
unconstitutional, and therefore incapable of conferring the authority, and assigning the 
duties which its words purport to confer and assign. 
The constitution vests the whole judicial power of the United States in one Supreme 
Court, and such inferior courts as congress shall, from time to time, ordain and establish. 
This power is expressly extended to all cases arising under the laws of the United States; 
and, consequently, in some form, may be exercised over the present case; because the 
right claimed is given by a law of the United States. 
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In the distribution of this power it is declared that "the Supreme Court shall have 
original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and 
consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court 
shall have appellate jurisdiction." 
It has been insisted, at the bar, that as the original grant of jurisdiction, to the supreme 
and inferior courts, is general, and the clause, assigning original jurisdiction to the 
Supreme Court, contains no negative or restrictive words, the power remains to the 
legislature, to assign original jurisdiction to that court in other cases than those specified 
in the article which has been recited; provided those cases belong to the judicial power of 
the United States. 
If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the legislature to apportion the 
judicial power between the supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that 
body, it would certainly have been useless to have proceeded further than to have 
defined the judicial power, and the tribunals in which it should be vested. The 
subsequent part of the section is mere surplusage, is entirely without meaning, if such is 
to be the construction. If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate 
jurisdiction, where the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and 
original jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the 
distribution of jurisdiction, made in the constitution, is form without substance. 
Affirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of other objects than those 
affirmed; and in this case, a negative or exclusive sense must be given to them or they 
have no operation at all. 
It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without 
effect; and, therefore, such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it. 
If the solicitude of the convention, respecting our peace with foreign powers, induced a 
provision that the supreme court should take original jurisdiction in cases which might 
be supposed to affect them; yet the clause would have proceeded no further than to 
provide for such cases, if no further restriction on the powers of congress had been 
intended. That they should have appellate jurisdiction in all other cases, with such 
exceptions as congress might make, is no restriction; unless the words be deemed 
exclusive of original jurisdiction. 
When an instrument organizing fundamentally a judicial system, divides it into one 
supreme, and so many inferior courts as the legislature may ordain and establish; then 
enumerates its powers, and proceeds so far to distribute them, as to define the 
jurisdiction of the supreme court by declaring the cases in which it shall take original 
jurisdiction, and that in others it shall take appellate jurisdiction; the plain import of the 
words seems to be, that in one class of cases its jurisdiction is original, and not appellate; 
in the other it is appellate, and not original. If any other construction would render the 
clause inoperative, that is an additional reason for rejecting such other construction, and 
for adhering to their obvious meaning. 
To enable this court, then, to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of 
appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction. 
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It has been stated at the bar that the appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in a variety 
of forms, and that if it be the will of the legislature that a mandamus should be used for 
that purpose, that will must be obeyed. This is true, yet the jurisdiction must be 
appellate, not original. 
It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it revises and corrects the 
proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that cause. Although, 
therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer 
for the delivery of a paper, is in effect the same as to sustain an original action for that 
paper, and, therefore, seems not to belong to appellate, but to original jurisdiction. 
Neither is it necessary in such a case as this, to enable the court to exercise its appellate 
jurisdiction. 
The authority, therefore, given to the Supreme Court, by the act establishing the judicial 
courts of the United States, to issue writs of mandamus to public officers, appears not to 
be warranted by the constitution; and it becomes necessary to enquire whether a 
jurisdiction, so conferred, can be exercised. 
The question, whether an act, repugnant to the constitution, can become the law of the 
land, is a question deeply interesting to the United States; but happily, not of an intricacy 
proportioned to its interest. It seems only necessary to recognize certain principles, 
supposed to have been long and well established, to decide it. 
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future govern-ment, such 
principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis on 
which the whole American fabric has been erected. The exercise of this original right is a 
very great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it, to be frequently repeated. The principles, 
therefore, so established, are deemed fundamental. And as the authority from which they 
proceed is supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed to be permanent. 
This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns to different 
departments their respective powers. It may either stop here, or establish certain limits 
not to be transcended by those departments. 
The government of the United States is of the latter description. The powers of the 
legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or 
forgotten, the constitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what 
purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be 
passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction between a government with 
limited and unlimited powers is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on 
whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed, are of equal obligation. 
It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any legislative 
act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the constitution by an ordinary act. 
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The constitution is either a 
superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with 
ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please 
to alter it. 
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If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the 
constitution is not law: if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd 
attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power in its own nature illimitable. 
Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming 
the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently, the theory of every 
such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is 
void. 
This theory is essentially attached to a written constitution, and is, conse-quently, to be 
considered, by this court, as one of the fundamental principles of our society. It is not 
therefore to be lost sight of in the further consideration of this subject. 
If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does it, notwithstanding 
its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give it effect? Or, in other words, 
though it be not law, does it constitute a rule as operative as if it was a law? This would 
be to overthrow in fact what was established in theory; and would seem, at first view, an 
absurdity too gross to be insisted on. It shall, however, receive a more attentive 
consideration. 
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. 
Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret 
that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of 
each. 
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply 
to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, 
disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; 
the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the 
very essence of judicial duty. 
If, then, the courts are to regard the constitution, and the constitution is superior to any 
ordinary act of the legislature, the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern 
the case to which they both apply. 
Those then who controvert the principle that the constitution is to be considered, in 
court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that the courts 
must close their eyes on the constitution, and see only the law. 
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions. It would 
declare that an act which, according to the principles and theory of our government, is 
entirely void, is yet, in practice, completely obligatory. It would declare that if the 
legislature shall do what is expressly forbidden, such act, notwithstanding the express 
prohibition, is in reality effectual. It would be giving to the legislature a practical and real 
omnipotence, with the same breath which professes to restrict their powers within 
narrow limits. It is prescribing limits, and declaring that those limits may be passed at 
pleasure. 
That it thus reduces to nothing what we have deemed the greatest improvement on 
political institutions -- a written constitution -- would of itself be sufficient, in America, 
where written constitutions have been viewed with so much reverence, for rejecting the 
  - 79 - 
construction. But the peculiar expressions of the constitution of the United States 
furnish additional arguments in favour of its rejection. 
The judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases arising under the 
constitution. 
Could it be the intention of those who gave this power, to say that in using it the 
constitution should not be looked into? That a case arising under the constitution should 
be decided without examining the instrument under which it arises? 
This is too extravagant to be maintained. 
In some cases, then, the constitution must be looked into by the judges. And if they can 
open it at all, what part of it are they forbidden to read or to oey? 
There are many other parts of the constitution which serve to illustrate this subject. 
It is declared that "no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state." 
Suppose a duty on the export of cotton, of tobacco, or of flour; and a suit instituted to 
recover it. Ought judgment to be rendered in such a case? Ought the judges to close 
their eyes on the constitution, and only see the law? 
The constitution declares that "no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed." 
If, however, such a bill should be passed, and a person should be prosecuted under it; 
must the court condemn to death those victims whom the constitution endeavors to 
preserve? 
"No person," says the constitution, "shall be convicted of treason unless on the 
testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court." 
Here the language of the constitution is addressed especially to the courts. It prescribes, 
directly for them, a rule of evidence not to be departed from. If the legislature should 
change that rule, and declare one witness, or a confession out of court, sufficient for 
conviction, must the constitutional principle yield to the legislative act? 
From these, and many other selections which might be made, it is apparent, that the 
framers of the constitution contemplated that instrument as a rule for the government of 
courts, as well as of the legislature. Why otherwise does it direct the judges to take an 
oath to support it? This oath certainly applies, in an especial manner, to their conduct in 
their official character. How immoral to impose it on them, if they were to be used as the 
instruments, and the knowing instruments, for violating what they swear to support! 
The oath of office, too, imposed by the legislature, is completely demonstrative of the 
legislative opinion on this subject. It is in these words: "I do solemnly swear that I will 
administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the 
rich; and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge all the duties incumbent on me as 
_____, according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the 
constitution, and laws of the United States." Why does a Judge swear to discharge his 
duties agreeably the constitution of the United States, if that constitution forms no rule 
for his government? If it is closed upon him, and cannot be inspected by him? 
If such be the real state of things, this is worse than solemn mockery. To prescribe, or to 
take this oath, becomes equally a crime. 
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It is also not entirely unworthy of observation that in declaring what shall be the 
supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the 
United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the 
constitution, have that rank. 
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and 
strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law 
repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are 
bound by that instrument. 
The rule must be discharged. 
 
Taken from National Archives Transcript of Document, in 100 Milestone Documents 
Collection www.ourdocuments.gov 
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